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Presidents and their advisers cite various legal principles when
they withhold documents from Congress and refuse to allow execu-
tive officials to testify before congressional committees. Congress can
marshal its own impressive list of legal citations to defend legislative
access to information, even when presidents assert executive privi-
lege. These legal and constitutional principles, finely-honed as they
might be, are often overridden by the politics of the moment and
practical considerations.
This Essay highlights the political settlements that decide most
information disputes. Courts play a role, but it is a mistake to believe
that handy cites from judicial opinions will win the day. Efforts to re-
solve interbranch disputes on purely legal grounds may have to give
ground in the face of superior political muscle by a Congress deter-
mined to exercise the many coercive tools available to it. By the same
token, a Congress that is internally divided or uncertain about its in-
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stitutional powers will lose out in the quest for information. Moreo-
ver, both branches are at the mercy of political developments that can
arise without warning and tilt the advantage decisively to one side.
This Essay begins with Part I, which reviews the constitutional
principles at stake when presidential decisions to withhold documents
from Congress collide with the needs of lawmakers for information
about the executive branch. Which implied power should yield to the
other? Part II analyzes the use of a fundamental legislative tool—the
appropriations power—to extract information from the president.
Subsequent Parts focus on other forms of congressional leverage: im-
peachment (Part III), the appointment power (Part IV), congres-
sional subpoenas (Part V), holding executive officials in contempt
(Part VI), House resolutions of inquiry (Part VII), the “Seven Mem-
ber Rule” (Part VIII), investigations conducted by the General Ac-
counting Office (Part IX), and requests to White House aides to tes-
tify (Part X), all of which may force executive officials to release
documents and discuss matters they would otherwise prefer to keep
private and confidential.
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN CONFLICT
No constitutional language authorizes the president to withhold
documents from Congress, nor does any provision empower Congress
to demand and receive information from the executive branch. The
Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional power of Congress
to investigate,1 and the president’s power to withhold information,2
but those powers would exist with or without judicial rulings. Over
the past two centuries, Congress and the President have insisted that
the powers are necessarily implied in the effective functioning of gov-
ernment. No doubt they are. The difficult and unpredictable issue is
how to resolve two implied powers when they collide. Some judicial
opinions provide guidance, but most of the disputes are resolved
through political accommodations.
A lengthy study in 1949, expressing the executive branch posi-
tion, asserted that federal courts “have uniformly held that the Presi-
dent and the heads of departments have an uncontrolled discretion to
withhold . . . information and papers in the public interest, and they
1. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
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will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.”3 That state-
ment, incorrect when written, is even less true today as a result of liti-
gation and political precedents over the past half century. Similarly
inaccurate is the claim that “in every instance where a President has
backed the refusal of a head of a department to divulge confidential
information to either of the Houses of Congress, or their committees,
the papers and the information requested were not furnished.”4 Con-
gress and its committees have enjoyed a more successful record than
that. Finally, the 1949 study seriously understated the coercive powers
of Congress when it claimed that the heads of departments “are en-
tirely unaffected by existing laws which prescribe penalties for failure
to testify and produce papers before the House of Representatives or
the Senate, or their committees.”5 Congress may hold both executive
officials and private citizens in contempt.
What informs the process of congressional access to executive
branch information is the constitutional structure of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances. Neither political
branch has incontestable authority to withhold information or force
its disgorgement. When these executive-legislative clashes occur, they
are seldom resolved judicially. Accommodations are usually discov-
ered without the need for litigation. On those rare occasions where
these disputes enter the courts, judges typically reject sweeping claims
of privilege by elected officials while encouraging the two branches to
find a satisfactory compromise.6 Courts look to legal precedent, “and
legal precedent is much too inflexible to apply in individual cases of
executive-legislative disputes.”7 The outcome is more likely decided
by the persistence of Congress and its willingness to adopt political
penalties for executive noncompliance. Congress can win most of the
time—if it has the will—because its political tools are formidable.
Although the congressional power to investigate is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, the framers understood that legisla-
tures must oversee the executive branch. At the Philadelphia Conven-
3. Herman Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10
FED. B.J. 103, 103 (1949). At the time he wrote his article, Wolkinson was serving as an attorney
with the Department of Justice.
4. Id. at 104.
5. Id. at 107.
6. E.g., United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v.
AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
7. Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and Political
Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 719, 745 (1993).
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tion, George Mason emphasized that members of Congress “are not
only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must
meet frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices.”8 Charles
Pinckney submitted a list of congressional prerogatives, including:
“Each House shall be the Judge of its own privileges, and shall have
authority to punish by imprisonment every person violating the
same.”9 The Constitution, however, provided no express powers for
Congress to investigate or to punish for contempt. What was left si-
lent would be filled within a few years by implied powers and legisla-
tive precedents.
II.  THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER
Presidents may have to surrender documents they consider sensi-
tive or confidential to obtain funds from Congress to implement pro-
grams important to the executive branch. This congressional leverage
appears in a number of early executive-legislative confrontations over
the treaty power. Although the House has no formal role in the treaty
process, once a treaty is ratified and requires appropriations to carry
it out, presidents must turn to the House for support, and share with
it whatever documents are necessary to obtain the funds. In some
cases, the administration may find it politically smart to share docu-
ments with the House while treaty negotiations are underway. This
Part also discusses the question of whether treaties or statutes should
be used to enter into international agreements.
A. Funding Treaties
One of the problems inherited by President George Washington
was the American practice of paying annual bribes (“tributes”) to
four countries in North Africa: Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.
The United States made regular payments to allow American mer-
chant vessels to operate in those waters without interference.10 On
March 11, 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson offered advice
to Washington on whether he should make a treaty with the Algeri-
ans “on the single vote of the Senate, without taking that of the Rep-
8. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937); see also id. at 199 (discussing Mason’s comments as reported by Madison).
9. Id. at 341.
10. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 45–50
(1997); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 24 (1995).
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resentatives.”11 Jefferson, who generally defended executive preroga-
tives, did not render narrow legal advice by arguing that the House
had no role in the treaty-making process. He analyzed the issue in
practical fashion: “We must go to Algiers with cash in our hands.
Where shall we get it? By loan? By converting money now in the
treasury?”12 He reasoned that a loan might be obtained on presiden-
tial authority, “but as this could not be repaid without a subsequent
act of legislature, the Representatives might refuse it. So if money in
the treasury be converted, they may refuse to sanction it.”13
Next, Jefferson said that just as Senators “expect to be consulted
beforehand” about a pending treaty, if Representatives need to fund
a treaty, “why should not they expect to be consulted in like manner,
when the case admits.”14 Here, Jefferson distinguished between the
president’s latitude in entering into treaties that could be imple-
mented without appropriations (self-executing treaties), and those
that were dead in the water unless Congress decided to provide funds:
A treaty is a law of the land. But prudence will point out this differ-
ence to be attended to in making them; viz. where a treaty contains
such articles only as will go into execution of themselves, or be car-
ried into execution by the judges, they may be safely made; but
where there are articles which require a law to be passed afterwards
by the legislature, great caution is requisite.15
Jefferson, advising “against hazarding this transaction without
the sanction of both Houses,” noted that the president concurred.16
After resolving a potential collision between the president and the
House, Jefferson learned about a dispute between the Senate and the
House. He found out that the Senate was willing to pay an annual
tribute to Algiers “to redeem our captives,” but was “unwilling to
have the lower House applied to previously to furnish the money;
they wished the President to take the money from the treasury, or
open a loan for it.”17 Jefferson said that Senators feared that if the
president consulted the House on one occasion, this “would give
11. Thomas Jefferson, The Anas, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 263, 294
(Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 295.
17. Id. at 305.
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them a handle always to claim it, and would let them into a participa-
tion of the power of making treaties, which the Constitution had
given exclusively to the President and Senate.”18
Senators tried to bolster their prerogative with another argu-
ment, but this one backfired. If the House voted for a particular sum,
Senators warned, “it would not be a secret.”19 Washington decided
against trying to circumvent the House by making a loan. Moreover,
he “had no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate, and did not
choose to take money from the Treasury or to borrow.”20 Washington
did not like having to persuade the House to fund a treaty that he
thought it should support as a constitutional duty,21 but Jefferson ad-
vised that “wherever the agency of either, or both Houses would be
requisite subsequent to a treaty, to carry it into effect, it would be
prudent to consult them previously, if the occasion admitted.”22 Ad-
vance consultation with the House was necessary, “especially in the
case of money, as they held the purse strings, and would be jealous of
them.”23
Washington followed Jefferson’s advice. In a message to Con-
gress on December 16, 1793, regarding a treaty with Morocco for the
payment of ransom and establishing peace with Algiers, Washington
forwarded to both the Senate and the House communications and
confidential letters that he asked the lawmakers to keep secret.24
Later that month, the House went into secret session to debate the
treaty, clearing the chamber “of all persons but the members and
clerk.”25 Some members objected that “secrecy in a Republican Gov-
ernment wounds the majesty of the sovereign people,” but in reply to
such arguments it was said that
because this Government is Republican, it will not be pretended
that it can have no secrets. The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
is the depository of secret transactions; his duty may lead him to
delegate those secrets to the members of the House, and the success,
safety, and energy of the Government may depend on keeping those
18. Id. at 305–06.
19. Id. at 306.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 307.
23. Id.
24. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 20–21 (1793).
25. Id. at 150.
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secrets inviolably.26
The galleries were cleared. For several days the House debated, in se-
cret, the confidential documents that Washington had made available
to them.27
Three years later, on the issue of the Jay Treaty, Washington
pursued a different strategy. In his long and honorable career, this ac-
tion marked a rare occasion where his public statement could be
called trite and disingenuous. He now argued that: (1) the House
could not be trusted with secret communications, and (2) the treaty-
making power—within the legislative branch—lay solely with the
Senate. On March 1, 1796, he advised Congress that the Jay Treaty
had been ratified.28 The treaty was controversial in many respects be-
cause Jay had departed from his instructions and agreed to various
restrictions on American commerce.29 With its express constitutional
responsibilities over foreign commerce, the House had a right to take
a close look.
Alexander Hamilton advised Washington not to release the
treaty instructions to the House, describing the instructions as “in
general a crude mass” that would do “no credit to the administra-
tion.”30 Washington knew his political footing was precarious. In a let-
ter to Hamilton, he said that “at present the cry against the Treaty is
like that against a mad-dog; and every one, in a manner, seems en-
gaged in running it down.”31 Washington acted, not on constitutional
principles, but on a political calculation. Withholding the documents
from the House, he knew, would enrage some members. Releasing
the documents, he feared, might make matters worse. He decided to
take a chance: keep the documents from the House and see what
happened. If the votes went against him, he could always take the
next step and negotiate a settlement with members of the House.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 151–55; see also CASPER, supra note 10, at 56–57 (illustrating how the House of
Representatives handled President Washington’s request for secrecy).
28. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 394 (1796).
29. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 85 (1976).
30. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, President of the United
States (Mar. 28, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 83 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1974).
31. Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to Alexander Hamil-
ton (July 29, 1795), in 34 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 262 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1940).
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Representative Edward Livingston took the floor to insist on
“every document which might tend to throw light on the subject.”32 In
offering a resolution that called for papers, he recognized that the
House had no formal role in the treaty process but cautioned that the
House possessed “a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into
effect, or refusing it their sanction.”33 Denied information, the House
might retaliate by refusing the funds needed to implement the
treaty.34 The House supported his resolution, sixty-two to thirty-
seven.35 While this debate was underway, some House members al-
ready had access to the treaty documents. Livingston, as chairman of
the House Committee on American Seamen, possessed many of the
treaty papers, as did other committee members and “any member of
that House who would request it.”36 Also, any House member could
have walked over to the office of the secretary of the Senate to see
the papers.37
Washington offered several reasons for denying the House the
documents, citing the need for caution and secrecy in foreign negotia-
tions, as well as the exclusive role of the Senate to participate as a
member of the legislative branch in treaty matters.38 However, mem-
bers of the House were not requesting documents as part of the treaty
process. They did not need the president to tell them the Constitution
excludes the House from treaty-making. They knew that. But the
treaty had been negotiated, approved by the Senate, and ratified. The
House was now requesting documents because it was being asked to
provide funds needed to implement the treaty. Washington seemed to
understand that right. A letter from Hamilton to Washington implies
that Washington had initially considered giving the House access to
the papers it requested.39
Representative Thomas Blount introduced two resolutions (both
adopted fifty-seven to thirty-five), stating that although the House of
32. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1796).
33. Id. at 428.
34. Id. at 427–28.
35. Id. at 759.
36. Id. at 461 (statement of Rep. Harper).
37. Id. at 588 (statement of Rep. Freeman).
38. Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to the Members of the
House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796), in 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760–61.
39. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, President of the United
States (Mar. 24, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81–82 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1974); see also Louis Fisher, Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Wa-
ters, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 583, 589–90 (2000) (discussing Hamilton’s letter).
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Representatives had no role in making treaties, whenever a treaty
treated subjects assigned to Congress as a whole,
it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or
laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and
duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate
on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into ef-
fect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be
most conducive to the public good.40
That was the situation when Washington asked Congress to ap-
propriate ninety thousand dollars to implement the Jay Treaty.41 A
resolution introduced by Representative Samuel Maclay stated that
unless the House received additional information, “it [would not be]
expedient at this time to concur in passing the laws necessary for car-
rying the said Treaty into effect.”42 The House never voted on Mac-
lay’s language. Instead, by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight, it appro-
priated funds to implement the treaty.43 Had the vote gone the other
way, President Washington would have been under pressure to sub-
mit additional documents to the House.
In 1803, President Jefferson understood that he needed the sup-
port of both Houses to implement the treaty he entered into with
France for the Louisiana Purchase. Because Congress would have to
ratify and pay for it,44 the treaty “[had to] be laid before both Houses,
because both have important functions to exercise respecting it.”45
The House debated a resolution asking Jefferson to submit certain
papers and documents relating to the treaty. Some portions of the
resolution were adopted, others rejected. The resolution as a whole
went down to defeat, fifty-seven to fifty-nine.46 With or without the
resolution, there is little doubt that the administration was willing to
provide the House with whatever documents it needed to support the
treaty. The House subsequently joined the Senate in passing legisla-
40. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796). For the voting record, see id. at 782–83.
41. Id. at 991.
42. Id. at 971.
43. Id. at 1291.
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to John Breckenridge
(Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 410 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed.,
1905).
45. Id.
46. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 418–19 (1803).
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tion to enable Jefferson to take possession of the Louisiana Terri-
tory.47
B. By Treaty or Statute?
The House can have access to treaty papers under other condi-
tions. If the Senate rejects or fails to ratify a treaty, the president may
turn to Congress and try to accomplish the same purpose through
regular legislation. For example, after the Senate failed to support a
treaty for the annexation of Texas, President John Tyler advised the
House that the power of Congress is “fully competent in some other
form of proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratification
of the treaty could have accomplished.”48 He gave the House the re-
jected treaty “together with all the correspondence and documents
which have heretofore been submitted to the Senate in its executive
sessions.”49 The papers embraced not only the series made public by
order of the Senate, “but others from which the veil of secrecy has not
been removed by that body, but which I deem to be essential to a just
appreciation of the entire question.”50 In this “treaty” matter the
House was fully coequal with the Senate. Congress passed the joint
resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, and it became
law.51
Treaties frequently stipulate that the assistance to be given an-
other country is subject to “the annual authorizations and appropria-
tions contained in United States security assistance legislation.”52
Thus, negotiators from the executive branch may promise a country
various levels of economic and military assistance, but what that
country receives depends on what Congress decides through the
regular legislative process. If the authorizing and appropriating com-
mittees in the House want additional documents, the executive
branch is in no position to withhold the information by claiming that
the treaty power is reserved to the president and the Senate.
47. Act of Oct. 31, 1803, 2 Stat. 245.
48. 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at
323 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter RICHARDSON].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Joint Resolution of Mar. 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797. For other joint resolutions used to accom-
plish a public policy that had failed through the treaty process, see LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 238 (4th ed. 1997).
52. Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, July 2, 1982, U.S.-Spain, Com-
plementary Agreement Three, art. 2, 34 U.S.T. 3885, 3966.
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The coequal role of the House in international agreements was
evident in 1994 when President Bill Clinton submitted the Uruguay
Round Agreements to Congress as a bill rather than as a treaty. The
purpose of the bill was to implement the worldwide General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Although Professor Laurence
Tribe testified that the proposal had such an impact on federalism
that it required presentation as a treaty rather than a bill,53 the subject
matter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
GATT—international trade—was certainly within the jurisdiction of
Congress as a whole to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”54
The bill was enacted into law on December 8, 1993.55
In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the issue of whether
NAFTA was a “treaty” requiring Senate ratification pursuant to the
Treaty Clause, or could instead be enacted as a statute, represented a
nonjusticiable political question.56 It found that the Treaty Clause
failed to “outline the circumstances, if any, under which its proce-
dures must be adhered to when approving international commercial
treaties.”57
III.  THE IMPEACHMENT POWER
In the struggle for information, Congress has especially strong
leverage when it decides to initiate the impeachment process. This
leverage exists not only when a president is personally accused of an
action that may merit removal from office, but extends more broadly
to malfeasance in the administration and to corruption, inefficiency,
53. S. 2467, GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Sci., and Transp., 103d Cong. 302–12 (1994) (statement of Professor Laurence Tribe,
Harvard Law School).
54. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 805–813 (1995) (challenging originalist accounts that
suppose the Treaty Clauses to have a plain meaning that cannot be altered without formal
amendment), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1223–49 (1995) (re-
sponding to Professors Ackerman and Golove by illustrating that “resort to extraordinary theo-
ries of constitutional change threatens to undermine genuine inquiry into the meaning of the
Constitution’s text”).
55. North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3473 (2000)).
56. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
57. Id. at 1315.
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criminal activity, unethical conduct, and personal wrongdoing by
agency officials.
A. Early Precedents
When President Washington denied the House the papers it re-
quested on the Jay Treaty, he said that the only ground on which the
House might have legitimately requested the documents was im-
peachment, “which the resolution has not expressed.”58 The power of
impeachment, said President James Polk, gives to the House of Rep-
resentatives
the right to investigate the conduct of all public officers under the
Government. This is cheerfully admitted. In such a case the safety of
the Republic would be the supreme law, and the power of the House
in the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the most secret re-
cesses of the Executive Department. It could command the atten-
dance of any and every agent of the Government, and compel them
to produce all papers, public or private, official or unofficial, and to
testify on oath to all facts within their knowledge.59
Executive privilege may also be politically imprudent in cases
where lawmakers make serious charges of administrative malfea-
sance. President Andrew Jackson told Congress that if it could “point
to any case where there is the slightest reason to suspect corruption or
abuse of trust . . . . [t]he offices of all the departments will be opened
to you, and every proper facility furnished for this purpose.”60 The
Supreme Court has noted that the power of Congress to conduct in-
vestigations “comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”61
B. Contemporary Examples
In 1982, Attorney General William French Smith said that he
would not try “to shield [from Congress] documents which contain
evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials from
proper review.”62 A year later, President Ronald Reagan remarked:
58. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1796).
59. 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 48, at 434.
60. 13 REG. DEB. app. at 202 (1837). For the entire discussion, see id. app. at 188–225.
61. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
62. Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to John Dingell, Chairman,
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce (Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 97-968, at 37, 41 (1982).
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“We will never invoke executive privilege to cover up wrongdoing.”63
He held to that policy in 1986 by allowing his Cabinet officials to dis-
cuss with Congress their conversations with him on the Iran-Contra
affair, and made available to Congress thousands of sensitive, classi-
fied documents.64 Through this cooperation he hoped to derail any
movement toward impeachment. Attorney General Edwin Meese,
III, thought the Iran-Contra affair had the potential for “toppling”
the president and triggering impeachment proceedings in the House.65
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, in a memorandum of Sep-
tember 28, 1994, provided guidance for congressional requests to de-
partments and agencies for documents. Congressional requests would
be complied with “to the fullest extent consistent with the constitu-
tional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.”66 Although
the doctrine of executive privilege would be asserted to protect “the
confidentiality of deliberations within the White House,” in circum-
stances that involve communications “relating to investigations of
personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to
assert executive privilege, either in judicial proceedings or in congres-
sional investigations and hearings.”67
In 1998, the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight voted to cite Attorney General Janet Reno for contempt
for refusing to release memoranda generated within the Department
of Justice (DOJ) regarding campaign finance issues. The committee
was restricted to reading redacted versions of the memoranda. The
contempt citation was not taken up by the House, but later that year,
as part of an impeachment effort against President Clinton, the
House Judiciary Committee gained access to the unredacted versions,
and the House Government Reform Committee later released the
memoranda to the general public.68
63. Ronald Reagan, News Conference (Feb. 16, 1983), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN, 1983, at 239 (1984).
64. REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433 and S. REP. NO. 100-216, at xvi (1987).
65. THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS 521 (1991).
66. Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, to All Executive
Departments and Agency General Counsels 1 (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
67. Id.
68. See infra Part VI.E.
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IV.  THE APPOINTMENT POWER
After submitting the name of a nominee to the Senate, the presi-
dent may discover that he is left with two options, neither one attrac-
tive. One is to surrender sensitive documents to Congress and agree
to have executive officials testify before congressional committees. If
that choice is unacceptable, the other option is to abandon the nomi-
nee. That dilemma is discussed in this Part with regard to the ap-
pointments of Richard Kleindienst in 1972 to be Attorney General,
and of William Rehnquist in 1986 to be Chief Justice. At any time in
the appointment process, a Senator may resort to “holds” on entirely
unrelated matters to force the release of executive branch informa-
tion.
A. Kleindienst Nomination
President Richard Nixon’s nomination of Richard Kleindienst in
1972 to be Attorney General precipitated lengthy hearings by the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Columnist Jack Anderson charged that
Kleindienst had lied in disclaiming any role in the DOJ’s out-of-court
settlement of antitrust cases against International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation (ITT).69 The Senate wanted Peter Flanigan, a
presidential aide and the chief White House figure involved in the
controversy, to testify. However, on April 12, 1972, White House
Counsel John Dean wrote to the committee that the doctrine of ex-
ecutive privilege would protect Flanigan and other White House
aides from testifying before congressional committees: “Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, and long-established historical
precedents, the principle that members of the President’s immediate
staff not appear and testify before congressional committees with re-
spect to the performance of their duties is firmly established.”70
By party-line votes, the committee rejected three motions.71 Nev-
ertheless, Senator Sam Ervin made it clear that the Senate should not
vote on Kleindienst “so long as those fellows aren’t coming up here
and the White House is withholding information.”72 With a filibuster
looming, the White House within a few days retreated from Dean’s
69. ITT Dispute Fails to Block Kleindienst Confirmation, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 207, 207
(William B. Dickinson, Jr. ed., 1972).
70. Sen. Ervin Hints Filibuster on Kleindienst After Panel Rejects Calling of Nixon Aide,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1972, at 4.
71. ITT Dispute Fails to Block Kleindienst Confirmation, supra note 69, at 221.
72. Panel Votes Not to Subpoena Nixon Aides on I.T.T, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1972, at 30.
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theory and Flanigan appeared at the hearings on April 20.73 Following
committee action, the Senate confirmed Kleindienst by a vote of
sixty-four to nineteen.
B. Rehnquist for Chief Justice
In 1986, President Reagan refused to give the Senate certain in-
ternal memoranda that the president’s nominee for Chief Justice,
William Rehnquist, had written while serving in the DOJ from 1969
to 1971. The memoranda were withheld to protect the confidentiality
and candor of the legal advice submitted to presidents and their assis-
tants.74 The legal theory might have been good but the political setting
was not. With Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee threat-
ening to subpoena the papers,75 the dispute prevented action on the
nomination of Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice.76 In an effort to
move those two nominations, President Reagan agreed to allow the
committee to read twenty-five to thirty documents that Rehnquist
had written while with the DOJ.77 Later, the committee requested and
received additional documents prepared by Rehnquist while in the
DOJ.78 The Senate then confirmed Rehnquist and Scalia.79
C. Senate “Holds”
The informal practice of imposing “holds” allows any Senator to
request that floor action on a bill or nomination be deferred. The
Senate Majority Leader may then decide whether to honor the re-
quest. Although there have been objections to “secret holds”—so-
called “anonymous” holds—Senators realize that holds are frequently
a legitimate means of pursuing legislative interests. Efforts to place
73. Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst of Arizona, to Be Attorney General—Resumed
(Part 3): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 1585 (1972).
74. Al Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Reagan Uses Executive Privilege to Keep Rehnquist Memos
Secret, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1986, at A1.
75. Howard Kurtz & Ruth Marcus, Democrats Seek to Subpoena Papers, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2, 1986, at A1.
76. George Lardner, Jr. & Al Kamen, Senators to Push for Rehnquist Memos, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1986, at A4.
77. Al Kamen & Howard Kurtz, Rehnquist Told in 1974 of Restriction in Deed, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 1986, at Al.
78. Senators Are Given More Rehnquist Data, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1986, at A3.
79. A similar situation developed two years later when the nomination of Stephen S. Trott
for the Ninth Circuit was delayed for four months until the DOJ agreed to give the Senate cer-
tain documents. See Fisher, supra note 39, at 600.
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limits on holds, such as requiring Senators to make their actions
known to the sponsor of a bill, have been difficult to enforce.80
There are many reasons for placing a hold, but often it is to ob-
tain information that the executive branch has refused to release to
Congress. In 1993, Senator John Warner announced that he would
release his hold on the intelligence authorization bill after receiving
assurance from the CIA that it would search its files for information
on Department of Defense nominee Morton Halperin. The CIA had
previously said that it could not find the documents requested by Re-
publican members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. CIA
Director James Woolsey had planned to brief committee Republicans
on this issue but apparently was ordered not to do so by White House
Counsel Bernard Nussbaum.81
In 1997, Senator Charles Grassley used holds to force the State
Department to comply with a statutory procedure that required the
administration to consult with Senators on any unanimous consent
agreements involving the Foreign Service promotion list. After the
administration missed several deadlines and extended deadlines in
submitting the list, he put a hold on nominations for ambassadors to
Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Belize. As Senator Grassley said, “we
need to get the administration’s attention so that they will abide by
the law.”82
In 1999, several senators wrote to the State Department, ex-
pressing their concern about the Department’s treatment of Linda
Shenwick, who worked at the U.S. mission to the United Nations
(UN). After giving Congress information on mismanagement at the
UN, she was threatened with a suspension and transfer to another
job.83 As a way of getting the department’s attention, Senator Gras-
sley placed a hold on the nomination of Richard Holbrooke to be
U.S. Ambassador to the UN. He explained that if lawmakers did not
protect agency whistleblowers, “a valuable source of information to
80. Helen Dewar, Senate Pact on “Holds” Seems to Be a Dead Letter, WASH. POST, Nov.
12, 2001, at A23; Helen Dewar, Senator Seeks to Stamp Out Secretive “Holds,” WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 2001, at A4.
81. Bill Gertz, CIA Offer of Help on Nominee Frees Up Authorization Bill, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1993, at A5.
82. 143 CONG. REC. S11,631–32 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997).
83. 145 CONG. REC. S7587–88 (daily ed. June 24, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley); Edi-
torial, Sen. Grassley’s “Hold,” THE HILL, Aug. 11, 1999, at 10.
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Congress [would] likely dry up.”84 After being reassured that Shen-
wick would not be punished by the State Department, Senator Gras-
sley lifted his objections to Holbrooke, who was confirmed, but
blocked approval of three other ambassadorial nominees to under-
score his intention to protect Shenwick.85
V.  CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS
The Supreme Court has held that the congressional power of in-
quiry “is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative func-
tion.”86 As a tool of this inquiry, both Houses of Congress authorize
their committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas to require
the production of documents and the attendance of witnesses re-
garding matters within the committee’s jurisdiction. If a witness from
the administration refuses to testify by invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment, Congress can vote to force testimony by granting the witness
either partial or full immunity.
“The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investiga-
tion” is “an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking.”87 To be legiti-
mate, a congressional inquiry need not produce a bill or legislative
measure. “The very nature of the investigative function—like any re-
search—is that it takes the searchers up some ‘blind alleys’ and into
nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need
be no predictable end result.”88
Committee investigations are appropriate when they satisfy cer-
tain standards. Legislative inquiries must be authorized by Congress,
pursue a valid legislative purpose, raise questions pertinent to the is-
sue being investigated, and apprise witnesses of the pertinence of the
questions asked.89 Private citizens, more so than agency officers, may
invoke certain constitutional protections, such as the First Amend-
84. Chuck Grassley, Letter to the Editor, Holds Practice Needs Big Changes, ROLL CALL,
Aug. 2, 1999, at 4.
85. George Archibald, Grassley Shifts Tack; Holbrooke Path Clear, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1999, at A6; Helen Dewar, Holbrooke Nomination Clears Hurdle, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1999, at
A4.
86. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
87. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975).
88. Id. at 509.
89. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1961); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409
F. Supp. 297, 305 (D.D.C. 1976).
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ment rights of free association and free speech.90 Witnesses may claim
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Also, con-
gressional inquiries may not interfere with adjudicatory proceedings
before a department or agency.91 Other arguments may be offered to
resist a subcommittee subpoena, such as the need to protect confiden-
tial trade secrets or to protect information within the DOJ.92 By stat-
ute, if a witness refuses to testify or produce papers in response to a
committee subpoena, and the committee votes to report a resolution
of contempt to the floor, the full House or Senate may vote in support
of the contempt citation. The contempt power is covered in detail in
Part VI.
This Part begins by discussing testimony and documents that may
be released as a result of Congress offering immunity to a witness.
Particular examples of committee subpoenas are then treated: Repre-
sentative John Moss against the Federal Trade Commission; a House
subcommittee requesting documents regarding DOJ policy on seizing
suspects abroad; another conflict between a House committee and the
DOJ, this time involving the Inslaw affair; a Senate committee re-
questing documents on Whitewater; and congressional access to ex-
ecutive documents on presidential pardons.
A. Immunity
A witness before a congressional committee may invoke the
Fifth Amendment right not “to be a witness against himself.”93 By
majority vote of either House or a two-thirds vote of a committee,
90. See Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 409 (noting the possible constitutional protections afforded
to accused persons where objections are made to the questions presented by a congressional
committee).
91. See Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that an inquiry by
the House of Representatives into a matter previously remanded to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was an “improper intrusion into the adjudicatory processes of the commission”).
92. See JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 83–
85 (1988) (discussing challenges to the sufficiency of congressional subpoenas); James Hamilton
& John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes Precipi-
tated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 145, 145–47 (1984) (discussing Nixon and
Reagan Administration arguments for withholding information from Congress). See generally
JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE 57–78 (1977) (describing the origin and develop-
ment of the congressional subpoena power and the use of executive privilege as a means to
evade this power); Raoul Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 865 (1975) (analyzing the historical development of congressional subpoena power and
the use of executive privilege by President Nixon).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
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Congress may nevertheless request a federal court to issue an order
that compels a witness to testify, giving the witness either partial im-
munity or full immunity. Partial immunity (“use immunity”) means
that the person’s testimony may not be used against him in a criminal
case, although the person might be prosecuted on the basis of other
information. Full immunity (“transactional immunity”) offers abso-
lute protection against prosecution for the offense.
During the Iran-Contra investigation in 1987, Congress offered
partial immunity to several witnesses, including Colonel Oliver North.
He was later convicted of three felonies, but those charges were sub-
sequently dismissed because of his immunized testimony. Under
standards imposed by the D.C. Circuit, prosecutors must show that a
defendant’s testimony could have had no influence on the witnesses
called to a trial. Otherwise, the remarks of the witnesses are “tainted”
and may not be used to convict.94
In such situations, Congress decides whether it is more important
to inform itself and the public rather than have a successful prosecu-
tion. Lawrence Walsh, the independent counsel for Iran-Contra, de-
scribed this setting of national priorities:
If the Congress decides to grant immunity, there is no way that it can
be avoided. They have the last word and that is a proper distribution
of power. . . . The legislative branch has the power to decide whether
it is more important perhaps even to destroy a prosecution than to
hold back testimony they need.95
B. The Ashland Case
On October 6, 1975, in his capacity as a member of Congress,
John Moss asked the Federal Trade Commission to make available to
him data gathered by the commission pertaining to lease extensions
on federal lands. The FTC denied the request because the data sought
constituted “trade secrets and commercial or financial information
[and] geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells,” and that such materials “were exempt from
94. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the principle that the prosecution
must show a legitimate source for evidence “wholly independent of compelled testimony”).
95. Lawrence E. Walsh, The Independent Counsel and the Separation of Powers, 25 HOUS.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1988). For proposals to change the immunity statute to make congressional grants
of immunity less costly to prosecutors and to Congress, see Ronald F. Wright, Congressional
Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-Contra, 80 MINN. L. REV. 407, 438–49 (1995).
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mandatory disclosure under subsections (b)(4) and (b)(9) of the
Freedom of Information Act.”96 Moss, pointing out that the statute
specifically provided that it did not authorize the withholding of in-
formation from Congress, made a second request, this time as chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, for the ma-
terial.
After the commission agreed to furnish Moss with the informa-
tion, Ashland Oil went to court to enjoin the FTC from releasing the
data. At that point the subcommittee issued a subpoena for the FTC
chairman to appear and bring the requested documents. The full
House then passed a resolution authorizing Moss to intervene and
appear in the case to secure the information needed for his subcom-
mittee. A federal district court agreed that the data at issue consti-
tuted “trade secret” information within the purview of section 6(f) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act but ruled that Ashland Oil had
failed to show that release of the material to the subcommittee would
irreparably injure the company. The court rejected the argument that
the transfer of the data from the FTC to the subcommittee would lead
“inexorably to either public dissemination or disclosure to Ashland’s
competitors.”97 Courts must assume that congressional committees
“will exercise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the
rights of affected parties.”98
That decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.99 A dissenting
judge concluded that the subpoena was invalid, but the majority
noted that FTC’s decision to turn over the materials to the subcom-
mittee “was not based on—and in fact predated—issuance of the sub-
poena.”100 The commission had agreed to provide Moss with the ma-
terial after receiving the letter in his capacity as subcommittee
chairman.
96. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). Subsection (b)(4) covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential”; subsection (b)(9) covers “geological and
geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4),
(b)(9) (2000).
97. Ashland Oil, 409 F. Supp. at 308.
98. Id.
99. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
100. Id. For additional analysis of Ashland, see Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert S. Grossman,
Congressional Access to Confidential Information Collected by Federal Agencies, 15 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 74, 79–83 (1977).
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C. DOJ Opinion: Seizing Suspects Abroad
Beginning in 1989, Congress held hearings on whether the FBI
could seize a suspect from a foreign country without the cooperation
and consent of that country. On November 8, a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee received testimony from William Barr,
head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ, State De-
partment Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, and Oliver Revell, Associ-
ate Deputy Director of Investigations in the FBI.101 Although OLC
concluded in 1980 that the FBI had no authority to make such ar-
rests,102 Barr explained that OLC had reexamined its position, and is-
sued an opinion on June 21, 1989, partially reversing the 1980 opin-
ion.103 Notwithstanding publication of the first opinion, Barr insisted
that the second “must remain confidential.”104 In withholding the 1989
opinion, he agreed to explain OLC’s conclusions and its legal rea-
soning.105
The subcommittee issued a subpoena on July 25, 1991, to obtain
the 1989 memorandum, arguing that it needed the memorandum to
determine whether it was necessary for Congress to legislate in this
area.106 Initially the administration decided to fight the subpoena.107
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh wrote to the subcommittee on
November 28, explaining why it could not have the 1989 opinion.108
However, the department eventually decided to allow one or more
101. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 (1991) (statement of
Rep. Don Edwards) [hereinafter FBI Authority to Seize: Hearing].
102. 4B OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL: 1980, at 543 (Margaret Colgate
Love ed., 1985).
103. FBI Authority to Seize: Hearing, supra note 101, at 3 (statement of William P. Barr, As-
sistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Joan Biskupic, Panel Challenges Thornburgh Over Right to Documents, 49 CONG. Q.
WKLY REP. 2033, 2080 (1991).
107. David Johnston, Administration to Fight House Panel’s Subpoena, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1991, at A12.
108. See Letter from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to
Don Edwards, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights 1–2 (Nov. 28, 1989), reprinted in FBI Authority to Seize: Hearing, supra note 101, at 92–
93 (“[T]he OLC opinion that [was] requested implicated a particularly compelling
confidentiality interest.”).
FISHER.DOC 01/03/03 11:08 AM
344 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:323
committee members to review the legal memorandum.109
D. DOJ Documents: The Inslaw Affair
On December 5, 1990, Representative Jack Brooks, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, convened a hearing to review the re-
fusal of Attorney General Thornburgh to provide the committee with
access to all documents regarding a civil dispute brought by Inslaw, a
computer company. Inslaw charged that the DOJ had stolen a com-
puter program the company had designed to keep track of civil and
criminal cases.110
On July 25, 1991, the House Judiciary Committee issued a sub-
poena to Thornburgh. Brooks said he wanted the documents in order
to explore whether the department had acted illegally by engaging in
criminal conspiracy. Thornburgh insisted that the Inslaw documents
amounted to “privileged attorney work products” for the civil dispute
that could not be shared with the committee.111 When the committee
failed to receive the materials, Brooks said that the committee would
consider contempt of Congress proceedings against the department.112
At that point several hundred documents were delivered to the
committee, which later released a formal investigative report on the
Inslaw affair.113 The committee gained access to sensitive files of the
Office of Professional Responsibility in the DOJ, took sworn state-
ments from Justice officials and employees without a department at-
torney present, and received more than four hundred documents re-
lated to “ongoing litigation and other highly sensitive matters and
‘protected’ under the claims of attorney-client and attorney work
product privileges.”114
109. Justice Yields to House, Averting Showdown, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2179, 2179
(1991); see also David Johnston, Both Sides Softening Stance on Documents on Foreign Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991, at B7 (noting the decision by the DOJ to consider granting House
subcommittee members limited access to the memorandum).
110. The Attorney General’s Refusal to Provide Congressional Access to “Privileged” Inslaw
Documents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks).
111. Paul M. Barrett, Thornburgh, Brooks Clash Over Charge of Wrongdoing at Justice De-
partment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at B7A.
112. Susan B. Glasser, Deadline Passes, but Justice Dept. Still Hasn’t Given Papers to
Brooks, ROLL CALL, Sept. 19, 1991, at 12.
113. H.R. REP. NO. 102-857 (1992).
114. Id. at 92–93.
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E. Whitewater Notes
In 1995, the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Whitewater
Development Corporation and Related Matters (the Senate White-
water Committee) issued a subpoena for certain documents. The
White House announced that it would withhold material about a No-
vember 5, 1993, meeting involving senior presidential aides and pri-
vate lawyers, on the ground that the documents were protected by the
lawyer-client privilege and executive privilege. William Kennedy,
who at the time was an associate White House counsel, took exten-
sive notes at the meeting.115 President Clinton said that he believed
“the president ought to have a right to have a confidential conversa-
tion with his minister, his doctor, his lawyer.”116 That argument would
apply if a president met with his private lawyer, but the issue was
complicated by the presence of government lawyers at the meeting.
Within a few days, the White House offered to turn over the
Kennedy notes if the committee agreed that the meeting was privi-
leged. The committee refused because it learned of other meetings at-
tended by White House officials and private attorneys. Unable to
reach an acceptable compromise, the committee voted to send the is-
sue to the Senate floor and from there to federal district court.117 On
December 20, 1995, the Senate began consideration of a resolution
directing the Senate Legal Counsel to bring a civil action to enforce
the subpoena. The resolution invoked a special statute regarding the
authority of the Senate Legal Counsel to sue for subpoena enforce-
ment orders.118 In a letter on that same day to the committee, White
House Special Counsel Jane Sherburne described various options,
stating: “We have said all along that we are prepared to make the
notes public.”119 The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-
115. Susan Schmidt, White House Rejects Subpoena; Whitewater Notes Called Confidential,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1; White House Gives Rationale for Balking at a Subpoena,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at B14.
116. Ruth Marcus & Susan Schmidt, Legal Experts Uncertain on Prospects of Clinton Privi-
lege Claim, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1995, at A14.
117. Susan Schmidt, Compromise on Notes Rejected; Senate Whitewater Panel Votes to En-
force Subpoena Resisted by White House, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1995, at A2.
118. Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in
Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 47, 56–57 (Spring
1998).
119. 141 CONG. REC. 18,963–64 (1995) (statement of Jane Sherburne, Special Counsel to the
President).
FISHER.DOC 01/03/03 11:08 AM
346 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:323
one to forty-five.120 On the following day, the White House agreed to
give the notes to the Senate Whitewater Committee.121
F. Presidential Pardons
Congressional subpoenas can be effectively rebutted by the ad-
ministration when they involve matters exclusively committed to the
president. When the House Government Reform Committee in 1999
sought records of private deliberations that led President Clinton to
offer clemency to sixteen members of the FALN (the Spanish acro-
nym for Armed Forces of National Liberation), a Puerto Rican ter-
rorist group, the White House refused. White House Deputy Counsel
Cheryl Mills told the committee that the president’s constitutional
authority to grant clemency “[was] not subject to legislative over-
sight.”122 Actually, that is an overstatement. Congress conducted con-
siderable oversight of the FALN clemency decision and received
about ten thousand pages of documents related to the decision.123
Several senior administration officials testified, including Deputy At-
torney General Eric Holder and Pardon Attorney Robert Adams.124
Two years later, Congress and the White House again battled
over access to documents concerning presidential pardons. The sub-
ject this time was the pardons issued by President Clinton during his
last day in office, particularly the pardon of Marc Rich. The House
Government Reform Committee held hearings on February 8 and
March 1, 2001, taking testimony from former Deputy Attorney Gen-
120. Id. at 18,993.
121. Whitewater Notes Being Surrendered; White House Ends Stand with Hill, WASH. POST,
Dec. 22, 1995, at A1. See Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 143, 189–93 (1998) (observing that White House Counsel cannot give the Presi-
dent representation subject to an absolute attorney client privilege).
122. Letter from Cheryl Mills, Deputy Counsel to the President, to Dan Burton, Chairman,
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 16, 1999), reprinted in
H.R. REP. NO. 106-488, at 115 (1999).
123. Id.; see also Clemency for FALN Members: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 97 (1999) (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice) (noting that the DOJ had delivered more than twenty-two thousand
pages to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). See generally Clemency for the FALN: A
Flawed Decision?: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. (1999)
(discussing the history of the FALN and the President’s decision to grant sixteen FALN mem-
bers clemency).
124. See Clemency for FALN Members: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
at, 106th Cong. 96–148 (1999) (relating testimony and panel discussion by Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder and Pardon Attorney Roger Adams concerning the president’s decision-
making process in granting FALN members clemency).
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eral Holder, former White House Counsel Jack Quinn, former coun-
sel to the President Beth Nolan, former deputy counsel to the Presi-
dent Bruce Lindsey, and former White House Chief of Staff John Po-
desta.125 A number of documents—including letters, notes, e-mails,
and telephone logs—that explain the process leading to the Rich par-
don are reprinted in the hearings.126 Additional documents on the
Rich pardon are reprinted in a subsequent committee report.127
VI.  THE CONTEMPT POWER
When the executive branch refuses to release information or al-
low officials to testify, Congress may decide to invoke its contempt
power. Although the legislative power of contempt is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution and exists as an implied power, the
Supreme Court recognized as early as 1821 that, without this power,
the legislative branch would be “exposed to every indignity and inter-
ruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate
against it.”128 If either House votes for a contempt citation, the presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate or the Speaker of the House shall cer-
tify the facts to the appropriate U.S. Attorney, “whose duty it shall be
to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”129 Individuals
who refuse to testify or produce papers are subject to criminal con-
tempt, leading to fines of not more than one thousand dollars and im-
prisonment up to one year.130
This Part begins by covering contempt actions from 1975 to 1981,
including legislative demands for documents from five executive offi-
cials: Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton; Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph
Califano, Jr.; Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan, Jr.; and Secretary
of Energy James Edwards. The next four Sections cover contempt ac-
tions against Secretary of the Interior James Watt, Administrator of
125. The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 192, 309 (2001).
126. E.g., id. at 75, 80–87, 115, 185, 247, 250, 259, 265, 305, 330, 350–51, 368, 971–72.
127. H.R. REP. NO. 107-454, at 463–708 (2002).
128. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821).
129. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2000).
130. Id. § 192; see also GRABOW, supra note 92, at 86–99 (1988) (discussing the scope of the
congressional contempt power); Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for
Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 567–68 (1991) (discussing civil contempt sanc-
tions, civil actions, criminal contempt sanctions, and other methods of enforcing congressional
subpoenas).
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the Environmental Protection Agency Anne (Gorsuch) Burford,
White House Counsel Jack Quinn, and Attorney General Janet
Reno.
A. Actions from 1975 to 1981
From 1975 to the start of the Reagan administration, Congress
several times threatened to hold executive officials in contempt for
refusing to cooperate with congressional committees. In the face of
statutory and constitutional reasons offered by the administration for
withholding information from Congress, the committees eventually
obtained access to the requested documents. To minimize such dis-
putes in the future, Congress amended language in a number of stat-
utes to clarify legislative access to agency information.
1. Rogers Morton. A 1975 tug-of-war between the branches,
with Congress the eventual victor, concerned reports compiled by the
Department of Commerce identifying the U.S. companies that had
been asked to join a boycott—organized by Arab nations—of compa-
nies doing business with Israel. Secretary of Commerce Rogers Mor-
ton refused to release the documents to a House Interstate and For-
eign Commerce subcommittee, citing the following language from
section 7(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1969:
No department, agency, or official exercising any functions under
this Act shall publish or disclose information obtained hereunder
which is deemed confidential or with reference to which a request
for confidential treatment is made by the person furnishing such in-
formation, unless the head of such department or agency determines
that the withholding thereof is contrary to the national interest.131
In his letter of July 24, 1975, to the subcommittee, Morton said
he understood the need to provide Congress “with adequate informa-
tion on which to legislate,” but concluded that “disclosing the identity
of reporting firms would accomplish little other than to expose such
firms to possible economic retaliation by certain private groups
merely because they reported a boycott request, whether or not they
131. Letter from Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce, to John E. Moss, Chairman,
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (July 24, 1979), re-
printed in Contempt Proceedings Against Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C.B. Morton: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 152, 153 (1975) [hereinafter Morton Comtempt Proceedings].
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complied with that request.”132 On July 28, the subcommittee issued a
subpoena. On August 22, in a letter to the committee, Morton again
reiterated his refusal to release the documents, explaining that his de-
cision was not based “on any claim of executive privilege, but rather
on the exercise of the statutory discretion conferred upon me by the
Congress.”133 However, he said he was prepared to make copies of the
documents available, “subject only to deletion of any information
which would disclose the identity of the firms reporting, and the de-
tails of the commercial transactions involved.”134
At subcommittee hearings on September 22, Representative
John Moss, chairman of the subcommittee seeking the documents,
told Morton that section 7(c) did not “in any way refer to the Con-
gress nor does the Chair believe that any acceptable interpretation of
that section could reach the result that Congress by implication had
surrendered its legislative and oversight authority under Article I and
the Rules of the House of Representatives.”135 Morton told Moss that
he had been advised by Attorney General Edward Levi not to make
the documents available to the committee.136 On November 11, the
subcommittee voted ten to five to find Morton in contempt for failure
to comply with the subpoena of July 28.137 The prospect of contempt
proceedings provided sufficient incentive for Morton to release the
material to the subcommittee.138
Congress passed legislation in 1977 to specify that section 7(c)
does not authorize the withholding of information from Congress,
and that any information obtained under the Export Administration
Act
shall be made available upon request to any committee or subcom-
132. Id. at 153–54.
133. Letter from Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce, to Harley O. Staggers, Chairman,
House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Aug. 22, 1975),
reprinted in Morton Contempt Proceedings, supra note 131, at 158.
134. Id.
135. Morton Contempt Proceedings, supra note 131, at 4 (statement of Rep. John E. Moss).
136. Id. at 6. For Levi’s Sept. 4, 1975, letter to Morton, see id. at 173–75.
137. Id. at 137 (statement of Rep. John E. Moss).
138. Arab Boycott Records, 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 343, 343–44 (Carolyn Mathiasen ed.,
1975); see also 121 CONG. REC. 3872–76 (1975) (providing background information for the Mor-
ton contempt story); id. at 36,038–39 (statement of Rep. James H. Scheuer) (discussing the con-
tempt resolution aimed at Morton and passed by the subcommittee); id. at 40,230 (statement of
Rep. John E. Moss) (noting Secretary Morton’s full compliance with the subcommittee’s sub-
poena issues on July 18, 1975); cf. at 40,768–69 (statement of Rep. Phillip Burton) (observing “a
victory for Congress” in the compliance of Secretary Morton).
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mittee of Congress of appropriate jurisdiction. No such committee
or subcommittee shall disclose any information obtained under this
Act which is submitted on a confidential basis unless the full com-
mittee determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the na-
tional interest.139
2. Henry Kissinger. In 1975, the House Select Committee on In-
telligence issued a subpoena to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
directing him to provide documents relating to covert actions.140 After
he refused, the committee voted ten to two to proceed to a contempt
citation.141 President Gerald Ford invoked executive privilege to keep
the material from the committee, explaining that release of the docu-
ments, which included “recommendations from previous Secretaries
of State to previous Presidents,” would jeopardize the internal deci-
sionmaking process.142 Nevertheless, under pressure of a contempt ci-
tation, an accommodation was reached. Three committee members
and two staff members visited the White House and listened to an
NSC aide read verbatim from documents concerning the covert ac-
tions.143 The committee, stating that the White House was in “substan-
tial compliance” with the subpoena, announced that the contempt ac-
tion was “moot.”144
3. Joseph Califano, Jr. In 1978, a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce began an investiga-
tion of the manufacturing process used by drug companies for making
generic drugs and pricing brand-name drugs. The panel looked into
charges that drug companies merely put trade names on drugs manu-
factured by generic drug firms and sold them at much higher prices.
One way to claim manufacturing responsibility was for a trade name
company to put an employee in a generic drug house while the prod-
139. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, sec. 113(a), 91 Stat.
235, 241 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(c)(10) (1994). Contempt actions against
Morton, Duncan, Watt, and Gorsuch are also explored by Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for
Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 197, 202–12 (1992).
140. H.R. REP. NO. 94-693, at 4–5 (1975).
141. Id. at 2.
142. Gerald R. Ford, News Conference (Nov. 14, 1975), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GERALD R. FORD, 1975, at 1867 (1977).
143. Kissinger Contempt Citations, 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 406, 407 (Carolyn Mathiasen
ed., 1975).
144. Id. at 407–08. For further details on this dispute, see Fisher, supra note 39, at 619–20.
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uct was being manufactured. To learn more about this “man-in-the-
plant” strategy, the subcommittee requested documents from the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Legislation had
been introduced to limit or eliminate the man-in-the-plant practice.145
In July, the subcommittee sent several letters to Secretary of
HEW Joseph Califano, Jr., for the documents. After failing to receive
the material, the subcommittee agreed on July 27 to subpoena Cali-
fano. The full committee signed the subpoena on August 4. In a
memorandum dated August 9, the DOJ took the position that lan-
guage in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which prohibited FDA
employees from disclosing trade secret information, justified the
withholding of the material from the subcommittee. The memoran-
dum argued:
Where an agency is barred by statute from disclosing certain in-
formation, congressional committees have no right to that informa-
tion unless there is a clearly expressed congressional intent to ex-
clude committee access from the general restriction on
disclosure. . . .
. . . Indeed, it is significant that section 301(j) explicitly provides
for disclosure to one of the coordinate branches of government, i.e.,
the courts, but makes no comparable provision for disclosure to
committees of the Congress.146
At a meeting with the subcommittee on August 16, Califano
produced some material, but also stated that any documents relating
to trade secret information and the manufacturing process would be
blackened out because of the DOJ’s legal analysis.147 Subcommittee
chairman John Moss made it clear that the blackened-out material
did not comply with the subpoena. Califano explained that his refusal
to release the unredacted material had nothing to do with separation
of powers or executive privilege, but rather, with statutory language
145. Contempt Proceedings Against Secretary of HEW Joseph A. Califano, Jr.: Business
Meeting of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 1–2 (Comm. Print No. 95-76, 1978) [hereinafter Califano Con-
tempt Proceedings] (statement of Rep. Jim E. Moss).
146. Memorandum from Michael J. Egan, Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Hale Champion, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare 5 (Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in Califano Contempt Proceedings, supra note 145, at 7, 10.
147. Califano Contempt Proceedings, supra note 145, at 4 (statement of Joseph Califano,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare).
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that prohibited the release of trade secret information. Congress, he
said, “has the power to change that statute.”148
The subcommittee then voted nine to eight to find Califano in
contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena.149 A month later,
the subcommittee dropped the contempt action after Califano turned
over the materials that had been subpoenaed. He explained that a
further review by the department of the withheld material disclosed
that some information had been “inappropriately deleted” from
documents given to the panel.150
4. Charles Duncan, Jr. On April 2, 1980, President Carter im-
posed a fee on imported oil and gasoline in an effort to reduce do-
mestic consumption. A subcommittee of the House Government Op-
erations Committee requested in writing, on April 8, certain
categories of material from the Department of Energy (DOE). With
no documents delivered, the subcommittee held a hearing on April 16
to investigate the delay. Thomas Newkirk, the department’s Deputy
General Counsel for Regulation, told the subcommittee that he was
“not prepared to submit the documents at this time” because White
House Counsel Lloyd Cutler was reviewing a pile of documents “be-
tween a foot and 18 inches high.”151 Newkirk thought the documents
might be subject to the claim of executive privilege because they re-
vealed the “deliberative process underlying the president’s decision to
impose the gasoline conservation fee.”152 The subcommittee voted
unanimously to instruct Newkirk to deliver the documents by five
o’clock that evening.153
148. Id. at 18.
149. Id. at 87; Mary Russell, House Panel Backs Contempt Citation After Califano Refuses to
Yield Data, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1978, at A2; House Panel Votes Contempt Citation Against
Califano, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1978, at 6; see also Editorial, Moss v. Califano, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 1978, at A18 (contending that the House vote forces a “senseless confrontation” be-
tween the DOJ and Congress and is representative of “the worst kind of congressional ca-
price”).
150. House Unit Ends Bid to Cite for Contempt HEW Chief Califano, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
1978, at 10.
151. The Petroleum Import Fee: Department of Energy Oversight: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 3, 27 (1980) [hereinafter The Pe-
troleum Import Fee: Hearings] (statement of Thomas Newkirk, Deputy General Counsel for
Regulation, U.S. Department of Energy).
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 35 (statement of Rep. Paul N. McCloskey).
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After the department failed to meet the deadline, the subcom-
mittee voted unanimously on April 22 to subpoena the materials from
Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan, Jr. On the following day, the
subcommittee received twenty-eight documents as well as a letter
from Duncan explaining that to the extent the subcommittee request
involved “deliberative materials underlying a major Presidential deci-
sion,” it would “seriously undermine the ability of the Chief Execu-
tive and his Cabinet Officers to obtain frank legal and policy advice
from their advisors.”154 Newkirk appeared before the subcommittee
on April 24 to state that the department would not comply in full with
the subcommittee’s request of April 8, but he did not rest his case on
executive privilege.155 By a vote of nine to zero, the subcommittee
subpoenaed Duncan to appear before the subcommittee on April 29
and bring the requested documents.156
Duncan, appearing at the April 29 hearing, told the subcommit-
tee: “I must decline to turn over the documents and I do not have
them with me at this time.”157 However, he also offered to allow the
subcommittee chairman and the ranking minority member to review
the documents “in confidence to assist in defining that request.”158
Representative Paul McCloskey (the ranking minority member) ob-
jected that “the idea that two members of a nine-member committee
should be trusted and some should not be is repugnant to the rules of
the House.”159 After further efforts to reach an accommodation failed,
the subcommittee voted eight to zero to hold Duncan in contempt for
not complying with the April 24 subpoena.160
The subcommittee held another hearing on May 14, with Duncan
again in attendance. Representative Toby Moffett, subcommittee
chairman, announced that
154. Letter from Charles Duncan, Secretary of Energy, to Toby Moffett, Chairman, House
of Representatives Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (Apr. 23,
1980), reprinted in The Petroleum Import Fee: Hearings, supra note 151, at 100.
155. The Petroleum Import Fee: Hearings, supra note 151, at 98–100 (statement of Thomas
Newkirk, Deputy General Counsel for Regulation, U.S. Department of Energy).
156. Id. at 116–17; Richard D. Lyons, House Unit Subpoenas Duncan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1980, at D3.
157. The Petroleum Import Fee: Hearings, supra note 151, at 122 (statement of Charles W.
Duncan, Jr., Secretary of Energy).
158. Id. at 123.
159. Id. (statement of Rep. Paul N. McCloskey).
160. Id. at 139; Richard D. Lyons, House Unit Cites Duncan for Gas-Tax Contempt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1980, at D18.
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at long last the subcommittee has been provided with every docu-
ment it feels it needs to conduct its inquiry. Subcommittee members
and staff have seen every document specifically demanded under the
subpoena we issued April 24, and any document we deemed useful
to this investigation has now been produced.161
On the previous day, a federal district court had struck down Presi-
dent Carter’s April 2 proclamation as invalid, either under the presi-
dent’s inherent power or under statutory authority.162 A White House
spokesman said that he did not think executive privilege was ever
formally asserted, either by President Carter or Duncan, although
there was consideration of doing so.163 In any event, the subcommittee
received the material it requested.164
5. James Edwards. The following year, at the start of the
Reagan administration, Secretary of Energy James Edwards narrowly
avoided a contempt citation from the House Government Operations
Committee. The dispute involved legislative access to documents re-
garding contract negotiations between the DOE and the Union Oil
Company to build an oil shale plant in Colorado. Committee mem-
bers were concerned that the department was moving too hastily in
awarding billions of dollars in federal subsidies to major oil compa-
nies, particularly prior to the Reagan administration’s plans to create
a Synthetic Fuels Corporation.165 Failing to obtain the requested ma-
terials, the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommit-
tee voted six to four on July 23 to hold Edwards in contempt.
The issue was complicated by division within the administration.
Edwards wanted to sign the contract, but Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Director David Stockman opposed federal subsidies
161. The Petroleum Import Fee: Hearings, supra note 151, at 142 (statement of Rep. Toby
Moffett); see also Dale Tate, President’s Oil Import Fee Assailed in Congress, Court, 38 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1307, 1308 (1980) (noting that on May 14, 1980, the subcommittee “held a
hearing in which [Secretary] Duncan appeared and the [submitted] packet of [executive] memos
was discussed”); Elder Witt, Carter Foiled in First Tilt with Executive Privilege, 38 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1352, 1352 (1980) (observing that Secretary Duncan submitted requested import
fee documents to the subcommittee after it unanimously voted to cite Duncan for contempt).
162. Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 620–21 (D.D.C. 1980).
163. Executive Privilege, Revisited, 38 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1753, 1753 (1980).
164. The subcommittee’s confrontation with Secretary Duncan, including correspondence,
appears in H.R. REP. NO. 96-1099, at 18–30, 33–56 (1980).
165. DOE’s Enforcement of Alleged Pricing Violations by the Nation’s Major Oil Compa-
nies: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 97th Cong. 2, 57–60
(1981).
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to the synthetic fuels program and had taken steps to block the con-
tract with Union Oil.166 The full committee was scheduled to vote on
the contempt citation on the morning of July 30, 1981. Edwards said
he would not produce the documents until the contract between the
DOE and Union Oil had been signed. President Reagan agreed to the
project and officials from the DOE and Union signed the contract.
Thirteen boxes of documents on the contract negotiations were deliv-
ered to the committee.167
B. James Watt
In 1981, Secretary of the Interior James Watt refused to give a
House subcommittee thirty-one documents relating to a reciprocity
provision in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. The specific country in-
volved was Canada. Watt based his decision on the judgment of At-
torney General William Smith that the documents dealt with “sensi-
tive foreign policy considerations.”168 The confrontation escalated to a
recommendation by the Committee on Energy and Commerce, voting
twenty-three to nineteen, that Watt be cited for contempt.169
Attorney General Smith insisted that “the interest of Congress in
obtaining information for oversight purposes is, I believe, considera-
bly weaker than its interest when specific legislative proposals are in
question.”170 This argument made no sense. The first major investiga-
tion by Congress—of General St. Clair’s defeat—was not conducted
for the purpose of legislation. Courts have consistently held that the
investigative power is available not merely to legislate or when a “po-
tential” for legislation exists, but even for pursuits down blind al-
166. See Martin Schram, Reagan Overrides Stockman, Backs Edwards on Synfuel, WASH.
POST, July 30, 1981, at A2 (observing the “strong objections” of OMB Director David Stockton
to a Union Oil synthetic fuels contract, and noting Stockton’s work with the House Energy and
Natural Resources Subcommittee to “outflank” Secretary Edwards).
167. Andy Plattner, Edwards’ Contempt Citation Headed Off by Approval of Synthetic Fuel
Contract, 39 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1425, 1425 (1981).
168. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: LEGAL OPINIONS REGARDING CLAIM
OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN IN RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA ISSUED TO JAMES G. WATT,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 2 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
WATT].
169. Contempt of Congress: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 379 (1982); William Chapman, Hill
Panel Votes to Cite Watt for Contempt, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1982, at A1.
170. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: WATT, supra note 168, at 3.
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leys.171 Moreover, Congress could easily circumvent Smith’s argument
by introducing a bill whenever it wanted to conduct oversight.
Smith also claimed that all of the documents at issue “[were] ei-
ther necessary and fundamental to the deliberative process presently
ongoing in the Executive Branch or relate[d] to sensitive foreign pol-
icy considerations.”172 However, foreign policy is not an exclusive
power of the president or the executive branch. Congress had a con-
stitutionally based need for the information: its power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.”173
Despite Smith’s initial legal position regarding the “fundamen-
tal” importance of the deliberative process, the documents were even-
tually shared with the subcommittee. On February 9, 1982, the sub-
committee voted eleven to six to hold Watt in contempt.174 By that
time, all but seven of the thirty-one subpoenaed documents had been
given to the subcommittee.175 The remaining documents were re-
viewed by subcommittee members on the conditions that subcommit-
tee staff could not assist, and that members could not photocopy the
documents but could take notes.176
C. Gorsuch Contempt
The examples above describe subcommittee and committee
threats to hold an executive official in contempt. In 1982, the House
actually voted on contempt. Anne (Gorsuch) Burford, Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), refused to release
certain documents. The administration told the House Public Works
Committee, which asked for documents on EPA’s enforcement of the
171. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975) (observing that “[t]he
very nature of the investigative function—like any research—is that it takes the searchers up
some ‘blind alleys and into non-productive enterprises’ and that ‘there need be no predictable
end result’ to a ‘valid legislative inquiry’”).
172. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: WATT, supra note 168, at 2.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
174. William Chapman, House Subcommittee Votes to Cite Watt for Contempt, WASH. POST,
Feb. 10, 1982, at A1.
175. Watt Says Congress Likely to Hold Him in Contempt, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1982, at
A9.
176. Contempt of Congress: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 385–86 (1982) (statement of John D.
Dingell, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations);
H.R. REP. NO. 97-898, at 8 (1982); Margot Hornblower, White House Avoids Hill Showdown
Over Documents, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1982, at A5; Phillip Shabecoff, Data That Caused Citing
of Watt Will Be Provided to House Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1982, at A21.
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“Superfund” program, that it could not see documents in active litiga-
tion files.177 In a memorandum to Gorsuch, President Reagan ex-
plained that the documents could not be released to the committee
because they represented “internal deliberative materials containing
enforcement strategy and statements of the Government’s position on
various legal issues which may be raised in enforcement actions rela-
tive to the various hazardous waste sites” by the EPA or the DOJ.178
Were Congress to accept such arguments, it would have to agree to
postpone legislative investigations for however many years it would
take the government to complete enforcement and litigation actions.
The House of Representatives voted 259 to 105 to hold Gorsuch in
contempt.179 The administration eventually agreed to release “en-
forcement sensitive” documents to Congress.180
D. Contempt Move Against Quinn
The House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
conducted an investigation of the 1993 firings of seven Travel Office
employees at the Clinton White House. The committee received the
documents it requested from the DOJ and other federal agencies, but
in September 1995, the White House informed the panel that Presi-
dent Clinton might claim executive privilege and refuse to turn over
some or all of 907 documents.181
In January 1996, the committee subpoenaed the records from the
White House, and in May it announced that it would hold the White
House in contempt unless it turned over the materials.182 On May 9,
the committee voted twenty-seven to nineteen to hold White House
Counsel Jack Quinn in contempt. It also voted to hold two others in
contempt: former White House Director of Administration David
177. H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 15, 21 (1982).
178. Id. at 42.
179. 128 CONG. REC. 31,776 (1982).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 98-323, at 18–40 (1983); H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 15. For further details
on the Gorsuch affair, see Ronald L. Claveloux, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and
Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1334. See generally
United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The difficul-
ties apparent in prosecuting Administrator Gorsuch for contempt of Congress should encourage
the two branches to settle their differences without further judicial involvement. Compromise
and cooperation, rather than confrontation, should be the aim of the parties.”).
181. Ann Devroy, Clinton May Assert Executive Privilege, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at
A11.
182. Susan Schmidt, House Prober Presses Demand for Travel Office Documents, WASH.
POST, May 3, 1996, at A2.
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Watkins and his aide, Matthew Moore.183 Committee Chairman Wil-
liam Clinger “said he would delay the next step, sending the action
citation to the House floor for a vote,” to leave open the possibility of
an accommodation with the White House.184 He offered to have
Quinn come to the committee before floor action.185 The administra-
tion released the disputed documents to the committee just hours be-
fore the House was scheduled to take up the contempt vote. The
White House also provided an eleven-page list of about two thousand
Travel Office documents for which it made a claim of executive
privilege.186
E. Contempt Action Against Reno
In July 27, 1998, the DOJ refused to turn over two internal
documents that urged Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint an
independent counsel in the campaign finance investigation. The
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee had subpoe-
naed a twenty-seven-page memorandum to Reno by FBI Director
Louis Freeh and a ninety-four-page report by Charles LaBella, for-
mer head of the department’s campaign finance task force.187 After
this refusal, the House committee voted twenty-four to nineteen on
August 6 to cite Reno for contempt. She warned that release of the
documents would “provide criminals, targets and defense lawyers
alike with a road map to our investigations.”188
183. Proceedings Against John M. Quinn, David Watkins, and Matthew Moore: Business
Meeting as Part of the Committee Investigation into the White House Travel Office Matter by the
House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 3, 88 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Business Meeting: Quinn]; R.H. Melton, House Panel Votes for Contempt Citation, WASH.
POST, May 10, 1996, at A4.
184. David Johnston, Panel Acts to Gain Travel Office Papers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at
A26.
185. Business Meeting: Quinn, supra note 183, at 46.
186. Ann Devroy & John E. Yang, White House Gives Congress 1,000 Pages of Travel Office
Papers, WASH. POST, May 31, 1996, at A10; Eric Schmidt, White House Gives Committee More
Papers in Dismissal Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A20. The contempt actions against
Quinn, Watkins, and Moore are summarized in H.R. REP. NO. 104-598, at 5–9 (1996). See gen-
erally HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, 104TH CONG., REPORT ON
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS IN THE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST JOHN M. QUINN, DAVID WATKINS, AND MATTHEW MOORE, 104th Cong. (Comm.
Print 1996).
187. Robert Suro, Justice Dept. Defies House Subpoena for Campaign Finance Probe
Memos, WASH. POST, July 28, 1998, at A8.
188. George Lardner, Jr., House Panel Votes to Hold Reno in Contempt, WASH. POST, Aug.
7, 1998, at A1.
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Reno, offering to give the committee a confidential briefing on
the documents, accused the panel of “political tampering with her
prosecutorial independence.”189 A few weeks later, she gave Commit-
tee Chairman Dan Burton access to heavily redacted versions of the
memoranda, leaving him roughly thirty percent to read.190 Burton
asked Reno to allow three former prosecutors and a former White
House deputy counsel to review the memoranda and give their opin-
ions to him and to the House Republican leadership. She rejected
that proposal.191 She did agree, however, to allow six other Republican
members of the committee to view the redacted copy, but insisted
that Burton withdraw the subpoena and drop the contempt citation.192
After these attempts to find common ground failed, Burton moved
forward with the contempt citation. Although the committee recom-
mended holding Reno in contempt, the matter was not taken to the
floor for House action.
As part of the impeachment action against President Clinton,
members of the House Judiciary Committee were allowed to read the
Freeh and LaBella documents. On December 2, 1998, U.S. District
Judge Norma Holloway Johnson granted the committee limited ac-
cess to the two memoranda.193 On June 6, 2000, the House Govern-
ment Reform Committee released the Freeh and LaBella memoranda
along with other DOJ documents related to the refusal to appoint an
independent counsel to investigate campaign finance issues of the
1996 presidential election.194
VII.  HOUSE RESOLUTIONS OF INQUIRY
A House resolution of inquiry “is a simple resolution making a
direct request or demand of the President or the head of an executive
department to furnish the House of Representatives with specific fac-
189. Sumana Chatterjee, Panel Steps Up Confrontation Over Campaign Finance Memos,
Voting to Cite Reno for Contempt, 56 CONG. Q WKLY. REP. 2175, 2175 (1998). For background
documents on the contempt citation against Reno, see H.R. REP. NO. 105-728 (1998).
190. Sumana Chatterjee, Reno Still Faces Citation for Contempt, 56 CONG. Q WKLY. REP.
2330, 2330 (1998).
191. Amy Keller, Burton Pushes Contempt Against Reno: Chairman Plans to Give Hyde
Documents for Potential Impeachment Inquiry, ROLL CALL, Sept. 21, 1998, at 3.
192. Editorial, The Contempt Citation, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1998, at A16.
193. Robert Suro & Ruth Marcus, Justice Memos May Yield Very Little, WASH. POST, Dec.
3, 1998, at A18.
194. George Lardner, Jr., Memos: Reno Was Warned, WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at A1.
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tual information in the possession of the executive branch.”195 It is the
practice to use the verbs “request” in asking for information from the
president and “direct” when addressing department heads. “The
resolution of inquiry is privileged” and “may be considered at any
time after it is properly reported or discharged from committee.”196
The privileged status applies only to requests for facts within the ad-
ministration’s control and not for opinions or investigations.197 If a
resolution of inquiry “is not reported to the House within 14 legisla-
tive days after its introduction, a motion to discharge the committee”
is privileged.198 Typically, the House debates a resolution of inquiry
for no more than one hour before voting on it.
There is no counterpart in current Senate practice for resolutions
of inquiry, although there are precedents dating to the end of the 19th
century and an effort in 1926.199 Nothing prevents the Senate from
passing such resolutions, but apparently the Senate is satisfied with
the leverage it has through other legislative means, including the
nomination process and Senate “holds.” Unlike the House, the Sen-
ate has no special practices for expediting consideration through
committee discharge or nondebatable motions, and “[r]esolutions are
not generally privileged for immediate consideration.”200
House resolutions of inquiry sometimes give the administration
discretion in providing factual information to Congress. For example,
in 1971, the House considered a resolution directing the secretary of
state to furnish certain information respecting U.S. operations in
Laos, but the language of the resolution included the phrase “to the
extent not incompatible with the public interest.”201 The House tabled
195. 7 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 24, § 8 (1977).
196. Id.
197. Id.; CHARLES W. JOHNSON, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 106-320, at 618 (2001).
198. JOHNSON, supra note 197, at 618.
199. See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE:
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at 799, 1205 (1992) (“Various Resolutions
‘requesting’ the heads of departments to transmit to the Senate certain information have been
amended before they were adopted, to read: ‘direct’ instead of ‘request.’”). In 1884, such a
change was ordered by the President pro tempore. Id. at 799. In 1926, a resolution requesting
certain documents from the Secretary of State related to the World Court was challenged on a
point of order. Id. at 1205. When the sponsor of the resolution asked for unanimous consent to
proceed, there was objection. 67 CONG. REC. 2,658 (1926).
200. S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at 1204.
201. 117 CONG. REC. 23,800 (1971).
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this resolution, 261 to 118.202 In 1979, in the midst of an energy crisis, a
resolution of inquiry requesting certain facts from the president re-
garding shortages of crude oil and refined petroleum products, refin-
ery capacity utilization, and related matters, was adopted 340 to 4.203
A more recent use of a resolution of inquiry occurred in 1995, af-
ter the Clinton administration offered a multibillion dollar rescue
package for the Mexican peso. As initially introduced by Representa-
tive Marcy Kaptur, the resolution (House Resolution 80) did not con-
tain discretion for the administration.204 It requested the president,
within fourteen days after the adoption of the resolution, to submit
information to the House of Representatives concerning actions
taken through the exchange stabilization fund to strengthen the
Mexican peso and stabilize the economy of Mexico. The House
Banking Committee voted thirty-seven to five to report the resolu-
tion, but with a substitute directing the president to submit the docu-
ments “if not inconsistent with the public interest.”205 On March 1, the
House adopted the committee substitute and agreed to the resolution,
407 to 21.206
Although the resolution established a deadline of fourteen days,
White House Counsel Abner Mikva sent a letter to Speaker Newt
Gingrich “that the Administration would not be able to provide” the
documentary material until May 15, or two months after the date set
in the resolution.207 By April 6, the Treasury Department had supplied
Congress with “more than 3,200 pages of unclassified documents and
475 pages of classified documents,” with additional materials prom-
ised.208 The White House said it was in “substantial compliance” with
the resolution.209
202. Id. at 23,807; Laos Secrets: House Defeat of Disclosure Move, 29 CONG. Q WKLY. REP.
1463, 1463 (1971).
203. H.R. 291, 97th Cong. (1979).
204. H.R. 80, 102d Cong. (1995).
205. 141 CONG. REC. 6409 (1995).
206. Id. at 6422.
207. Carroll J. Doherty, House GOP Considers Stance on Bailout of Mexico, 53 CONG. Q
WKLY. REP. 880, 880 (1995).
208. Mike Mills, Treasury Says Congress Given Papers on Mexico, WASH. POST, April 7,
1995, at F1.
209. Clinton Leads Mexico Bailout Effort, 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 10-16, 10-17 (1995).
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VIII.  THE “SEVEN MEMBER RULE”
In 2001, seventeen Democrats and one Independent in the
House invoked a seldom-used statute, first enacted in 1928, that re-
quires executive agencies to furnish information if requested by seven
members of the House Committee on Government Reform or five
members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. After
the administration challenged the constitutionality of this statutory
provision, a federal district court ruled in favor of the lawmakers.
This case, under appeal to the Ninth Circuit as of this writing, raises
the question of what Congress needs to do to gain access to executive
branch documents. May it act by committee, or by a subgroup within
a committee, or does congressional access requires action at least by a
full chamber and perhaps even action by both chambers and presen-
tation of a bill or resolution to the president?
A. Origin of the Statute
In 1928, as part of a statute to discontinue certain reports re-
quired by law to be made to the legislative branch, Congress added a
section requiring “[e]very executive department and independent es-
tablishment of the government,” upon request of “any seven mem-
bers” of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive De-
partments, or “any five members” of the Senate Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, to “furnish any informa-
tion requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of
said committee.”210 As presently codified, the statutory language re-
quires an “Executive agency,” on request of seven members of the
House committee or five members of the Senate committee, to sub-
mit “any information requested of it relating to any matter within the
jurisdiction of the committee.”211
The statutory language clearly gives seven members in the House
and five members in the Senate, from the designated committees, the
right to ask for certain executive information within the jurisdiction of
their committee. The dispute between the executive and legislative
branches is the type of information that must be given to Congress.
Part of the House legislative history suggests that the legislative
210. Act of May 27, 1928, ch. 901, § 2, 45 Stat. 986, 996 (1928).
211. 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (2000). The codified language refers to the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations (now the Committee on Government Reform) and the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs.
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authority for requesting information is limited to what had been pre-
viously sent to Congress in agency reports, but was now being discon-
tinued: “To save any question as to the right of the House of Repre-
sentatives to have furnished any of the information contained in the
reports proposed to be abolished, a provision has been added to the
bill requiring such information.”212 Yet language on the same page of
this House report suggests a much larger universe of information
sought:
The reports come in; they are not valuable enough to be printed,
they are referred to committees, and that is the end of the matter.
The departmental labor in preparation is a waste of time and the
files of Congress are cluttered up with a mass of useless reports. If
any information is desired by any Member or committee upon a par-
ticular subject that information can be better secured by a request
made by an individual Member or committee, so framed as to bring
out the special information desired.213
The House bill authorized access to executive branch informa-
tion only by seven members of the designated House committee. In
reporting the bill, the Senate decided to grant access also to five
members of its expenditure committee.214 The Senate report includes
the language of the House report, but adds language that can be read
to limit the request for agency information to what had been reported
in the past in obsolete or useless reports: “This section makes it pos-
sible to require any report discontinued by the language of this bill to
be resubmitted to either House upon its necessity becoming evident
to the membership of either body.”215 Debate on the Senate floor re-
inforces that impression. The provision would enable either commit-
tee to “reinstate any report that was found to be needed.”216
Two legal issues emerge: the type of information that the two
committees are entitled to receive, and the legal remedies available to
Congress if an agency fails to comply. The statutory language is
broad, whereas parts of the legislative history suggest a narrower field
of information. As for remedies, what happens if an agency decides to
212. H.R. REP. NO. 1757, at 6 (1928).
213. Id. (emphasis added). Floor debate in the House merely quotes the language of the sec-
tion giving seven members of the House committee the right to request information from the
executive branch. 69 CONG. REC. 9417 (1928).
214. S. REP. NO. 1320, at 1 (1928).
215. Id. at 4.
216. 69 CONG. REC. 10,613 (1928) (statement by Senator Sackett).
FISHER.DOC 01/03/03 11:08 AM
364 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:323
ignore a request from seven members of the House committee or five
members of the Senate committee? Would those committee members
have to go to the full committee for support, or to the full chamber, or
could they take their dispute directly to court?
B. The Waxman Request
Acting under the 1928 legislation, Representative Henry Wax-
man, ranking member of the House Committee on Government Re-
form, wrote to Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans on April 6,
2001, requesting the department to provide the adjusted census data
produced as part of the 2000 census.217 Sixteen Democrats and one
Independent from the committee joined Waxman in signing the let-
ter. Waxman explained that the Census Bureau compiled two sets of
data. One population count, determined through the use of census
forms returned by mail and by interviews conducted at addresses
where no census form was returned, had been made public. A second
set of data, using statistical techniques to correct for errors in the
population count, was not released to the public. Relying on news re-
ports, Waxman said that the unadjusted numbers released to the
public “missed at least 6.4 million people and counted at least 3.1 mil-
lion people twice.”218
Waxman offered several reasons why his committee needed the
information. The committee wanted the second set of data because it
was “actively considering whether to amend the law regarding the
timing and release of adjusted and unadjusted census data.”219 Second,
the information “could have an enormous impact on the allocation by
Congress of more than $185 billion in population-based federal grant
funds.”220 Third, the information “could have a significant bearing on
the appropriateness of congressional redistricting efforts currently
being undertaken by state governments.”221 Waxman requested the
adjusted data on or before April 20, 2001.
217. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform, et al., to Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce 1 (Apr.
6, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 2–3.
221. Id. at 3.
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After receiving no response from the Commerce Department,
Waxman wrote another letter to Evans, dated May 16, 2001.222
Through phone calls from committee staff members, Waxman
learned that the matter was under “active consideration” by the de-
partment’s Office of General Counsel. He told Evans that if he did
not receive a written response by the end of the week, he would con-
clude that the department had made a decision not to respond.223
C. District Court Decision
On May 21, Waxman and fifteen other members of the commit-
tee filed suit in federal district court, requesting declaratory and in-
junctive relief.224 Three months later, Waxman and the other plaintiffs
filed a memorandum of law in support of a motion for summary
judgment.225 The brief argued that the Seven Member Rule compelled
disclosure of the information, that no exemption was claimed or ap-
plicable, and that the use of “shall” in the statute mandated executive
agencies to submit information requested by members of the commit-
tee.226 Instead of identifying parts of the legislative history that sug-
gested a limited reach to agency information, the brief cited the statu-
tory adjective “any” (modifying “information”) as evidence that the
committee could request a broad range of information.227 As to legis-
lative history, the brief looked to language that encouraged lawmak-
ers to make particularized, individual requests for information
needed by the committee.228
Did Waxman and his colleagues have standing to sue in court?
They referred to the Administrative Procedure Act as granting a
cause of action, and empowering the district court to “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”229 It was a mat-
ter, they said, of enforcing a statutory right. Notwithstanding Raines
222. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform, to Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce 1 (May 16,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
223. Id.
224. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Waxman v. Evans, No. 01-04530
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002). Representatives Paul E. Kanjorski and Jim Turner, who had signed
the April 6, 2001, letter to Evans, did not sign the Complaint.
225. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Wax-
man v. Evans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
226. Id. at 1.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1–2.
229. Id. at 18 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 706(1) (2000)).
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v. Byrd, which denied standing to lawmakers who sued in their law-
making capacity,230 the sixteen members said they were not suing in
their lawmaking capacity, but rather to enforce a statutory right
granted to them.231
The DOJ filed its opposition to the plaintiff’s motion on Novem-
ber 26.232 The brief described the issue as consisting of two disputes:
one “between the Executive and Legislative branches over access to
information” possessed by executive officials, and another “between
the minority and majority members of the House Committee on
Government Reform.”233 Consequently, the district court “should de-
cline to wade into this political thicket” and allow the controversy to
be “sorted out in the political realm.”234 Moreover, even if the court
decided the case, the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute—singling
out the words “shall” and “any”—ignored “entirely Congress’s read-
ily ascertainable purpose.”235 The government interpreted the statute
as preserving “access to a limited universe of agency reports for
members of two of Congress’ numerous committees.”236 The broader
interpretation pressed by plaintiffs “would raise serious doubts about
the constitutionality of the statute.”237 The brief warned that
“[g]ranting unlimited access to agency files may cause unwarranted
interference with the Executive function to ‘take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.’”238 The plaintiffs’ interpretation, said the gov-
ernment’s brief, was “constitutionally suspect, because this absolute
power is proposed to be lodged not in any committee, or subcommit-
tee, but in a mere fraction of the membership of only two of Con-
gress’ more than 40 full committees.”239
On January 22, 2002, the district court ruled in favor of the plain-
tiffs. District Judge Lourdes Baird rejected the government’s recom-
mendation that the dispute should be “sorted out in the political
230. 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
231. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 20,
Waxman v. Evans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
232. Secretary’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
Waxman v. Evans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
233. Id. at 1.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2.
238. Id. at 18 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
239. Id. at 19.
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realm” because “there is no room for compromise and coopera-
tion.”240 The circumstances of the case “indicate[d] that judicial inter-
vention has become necessary to solve this inter-branch dispute.”241
Unlike some of the other cases cited by the government, where courts
advised members of Congress that they could get relief by persuading
their colleagues to repeal an objectionable statute, Judge Baird con-
cluded that “Plaintiffs’ rights cannot be vindicated by congressional
repeal of a statute; rather, their rights may actually be vindicated by
the effectuation of a statute.”242 She therefore denied the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss.
Moving to the merits, Judge Baird ruled that the plain language
of the Seven Member Rule “mandates that the Secretary release the
requested data to Plaintiffs.”243 She cited Supreme Court decisions
stating that “if no ambiguity in the plain statutory language is dis-
cerned, as in the instant situation, legislative history need not be con-
sulted.”244 Nevertheless, “out of an abundance of caution,”245 she ex-
amined what lawmakers had said in committee reports and floor
statements. Although it was clear that Congress intended either
House to obtain information contained in discontinued reports, “such
a recognition does not necessarily mean that the provision was de-
signed to merely accomplish that narrow aim.”246 Because of ambigu-
ity in the legislative history, she followed “the text rather than the
legislative history.”247
Regarding the constitutional doubts raised by the government,
Judge Baird recognized “the settled rule that a valid constitutional
claim of Executive Privilege can defeat a congressional demand for
information.”248 However, only after the government made an express
claim of executive privilege would it be necessary for a court to con-
sider “whether the disclosure provisions of the act exceeds the consti-
tutional power of Congress to control the actions of the executive
240. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment; Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Waxman v.
Evans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
241. Id. at 10.
242. Id. at 12.
243. Id. at 15.
244. Id. at 16 (citing Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808–09 n.3 (1989)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 18.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 19.
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branch.”249 She examined the government’s claim that a constitutional
issue exists because the congressional power to request information is
not lodged in a committee or subcommittee but rather in a fraction of
one committee. Baird noted that many committees and subcommit-
tees give a single member of Congress (the chairman) the power to
issue a subpoena.250 Based on the available facts, she ordered Evans to
release the requested census data to the plaintiffs.251
D. Request for Reconsideration
Following Judge Baird’s decision, the government filed a memo-
randum in support of a motion for reconsideration.252 For the first
time, the government charged that the plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing to sue and had no right of action in court either under the
Seven Member Rule or the Administrative Procedure Act.253 Moreo-
ver, the government now contended that the Seven Member Rule is a
“rule of proceeding” within the meaning of Article I, section 5, clause
2, of the Constitution, and “has been superceded by House rules and
is therefore no longer judicially enforceable.”254 It reiterated its posi-
tion that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its investigatory
powers to a few lawmakers and allow them to sue the executive
branch to compel compliance with a request for information.255
The plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration, pointing
out that Ninth Circuit law “makes clear that reconsideration is an ‘ex-
traordinary remedy’ that may not be used to ‘raise arguments . . . for
the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in
the litigation.’”256 The plaintiffs also found the government at error
when it argued that Congress could not delegate to sub-parties the
authority to acquire information, pointing to powers delegated to the
General Accounting Office to gather information from the executive
branch (covered in Part IX of this Essay) and the subpoena powers
that may be exercised by committees, subcommittees, and even indi-
249. Id. at 20.
250. Id. at 20–21.
251. Id. at 21.
252. Secretary’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Waxman v. Ev-
ans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
253. Id. at 1.
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id. at 19.
256. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Motion for a Stay at 1, Waxman v. Evans, No. 01-
04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
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vidual committee chairmen.257 Similarly, the plaintiffs found no merit
in the argument that the Seven Member Rule had been superseded
by subsequent House rules.258
In a brief opinion on March 21, 2002, Judge Baird denied the mo-
tion for reconsideration. She pointed out that although the plaintiffs
discussed the standing issue in their opening brief, the government
had not addressed that issue.259 The government, in its initial brief,
had also failed to raise arguments as to whether the plaintiffs pos-
sessed a judicially enforceable right of action, and whether the Seven
Member Rule had been superseded by House rules.260
E. Briefs for the Ninth Circuit
In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ repeated some of the
arguments that had failed in the district court: (1) the Seven Member
Rule “marks a sharp departure from the settled means by which Con-
gress seeks information from the executive branch,” (2) those prece-
dents preclude “small minorities from compelling disclosure of infor-
mation when the majority believes that disclosure would be
inappropriate or even harmful,” and (3) there is a “general presump-
tion that disputes between the branches will be resolved by political
rather than judicial means.”261 The brief states that Congress “in-
tended to preclude review of requests made under Section 2954 and
to commit such decisions to the discretion of the executive branch.”262
How could there be a political resolution if the decision to release in-
formation to Congress is left solely to the discretion of the executive
branch? The government also argued that the lawmakers lacked
standing to bring the suit, but that if the Ninth Circuit were to grant
standing, the lawmakers should have access only to what would be
permitted under a restrictive reading of the 1928 statute: information
from discontinued reports.263
The government brief acknowledges that Congress has author-
ized committees, subcommittees, and even committee chairmen to is-
257. Id. at 17–18.
258. Id. at 19–20.
259. Civil Minutes—General at 3, Waxman v. Evans, No. 01-04530 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2002).
260. Id.
261. Brief for the Appellant at 5–6, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. docketed May
10, 2002).
262. Id. at 6.
263. Id. at 7–8.
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sue subpoenas,264 but that enforcement of a subpoena requires a vote
by the full chamber and dependence on a U.S. Attorney to file an ac-
tion in federal court.265 Allowing Waxman and the other lawmakers to
file an enforcement action in their own name would be contrary to
“[t]hat longstanding approach.”266 Toward the end of its brief, the
government concludes that action even by a full House would be in-
sufficient. Relying on INS v. Chadha,267 the government stated that
requests by Congress for information from the executive branch, be-
cause they affect the legal rights and duties of executive officials out-
side the legislative branch, would require bicameral action and pre-
sentment of a bill to the president for his signature or veto.268
The brief for Waxman and the other lawmakers argued that
“[u]nder settled Ninth Circuit precedent, adjusted census data is not
privileged and must be made available to anyone under the Freedom
of Information Act.”269 The brief repeated the district court’s position
that the case did not involve a claim of executive privilege, and that it
was unlikely for the president to assert such a claim because the
Seven Member Rule “applies only to agency records, and does not
reach records of the President, his personal advisors, or White House
staff.”270 As to the government’s position that the Seven Member Rule
merely allows lawmakers to ask for information, but not receive it,
the Waxman brief stated that the government “points to no evidence”
to support the theory that when Congress enacted section 2954 “it in-
tended to render the provision unenforceable.”271
Whereas the government asserts that section 2954 allows mem-
bers of the two committees to request only documents from discon-
tinued reports, the Waxman memorandum relied on legislative his-
tory to argue for a broader universe of information: “If any
information is desired by any Member or committee upon a particular
subject that information can be better secured by a request made by
264. Id. at 21.
265. Id. at 22–23.
266. Id. at 23.
267. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
268. Brief for the Appellant at 5–6, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. docketed May
10, 2002).
269. Brief for the Appellees at 2, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. docketed May
10, 2002).
270. Id. at 4.
271. Id. at 13.
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an individual Member or committee, so framed as to bring out the
special information desired.”272
With regard to the government’s argument that “Congress in-
tended to preclude review of requests made under Section 2954 and
to commit such decisions to the discretion of the executive branch,”
the Waxman brief stated that this argument “defies logic” and “de-
pends on the submission that, when Congress enacted § 2954, it in-
tended to render the provision a toothless tiger that agencies were
free to ignore with impunity. . . . That submission is [at] war with the
plain text of § 2954.”273 The government urged the court to dismiss
lawsuits brought by members of Congress when the issue is essentially
an intra-branch conflict, but the Waxman brief states that the dispute
raised by Waxman “is not with congressional colleagues . . . .
[P]laintiffs do not seek to enact, amend or repeal legislation. They
seek to enforce an existing statutory command against a federal offi-
cer . . . .”274
Finally, the Waxman brief addresses the government’s claim that
under INS v. Chadha,275 legislative demands for information from the
executive branch must comply with bicameralism and presentment.
The distinction here is that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has held
that Congress may not legislate without action by both Houses . . . it
has never suggested that the Constitution places comparable limits on
Congress’ oversight and investigatory powers.”276 The Supreme Court
has recognized the power of individual congressional committees to
investigate and issue subpoenas.277
The House of Representatives submitted two amici briefs: one by
the Office of General Counsel, and the other by the House Demo-
cratic Leadership. The first argued that executive-legislative struggles
over access to information should be left to the political process, not
to the courts. The second supports the district court ruling that sec-
tion 2954 mandates disclosure of the census data to Waxman and the
other plaintiffs. The Office of General Counsel submitted its brief to
the leadership of both parties, but the two Democratic leaders de-
272. Id. at 20 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 70-1757, at 6 (1928)).
273. Id. at 34.
274. Id. at 50.
275. 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
276. Brief for the Appellees at 54-55, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. docketed
May 10, 2002).
277. Id. at 55 (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 158, 160–61 (1927)).
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cided not to join. Thus, the brief represents only the views of the
three Republican members of the bipartisan group: Speaker Dennis
Hastert, Majority Leader Dick Armey, and Majority Whip Tom De-
lay.278
The House General Counsel brief points out that congressional
efforts to obtain executive documents take place “almost entirely out-
side the judicial arena,”279 through political negotiation, accommoda-
tion, compromise, and resort to subpoenas and contempt citations.280
The district court’s decision “would radically change the manner in
which executive/legislative information access disputes are resolved,”
and would conflict with House rules “designed to maintain institu-
tional control over the House’s investigatory authority.”281 After
reaching those judgments, the brief stated that Congress should be
able to obtain executive documents needed for legislative and over-
sight functions, that the Department of Commerce construed section
2954 too narrowly, and that executive agencies have an obligation to
respond in good faith to legislative requests under the 1928 statute.282
The two Democratic members, Minority Leader Dick Gephardt
and Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi, filed a separate amicus brief, argu-
ing that the procedure for holding someone in contempt of Congress
(requiring action by the full House or Senate) is distinct from statutes
that mandate release of executive branch information to Congress.283
The brief placed section 2954 in the “tradition of statutes mandating
the public release of unprivileged Executive information, without re-
sort to contempt powers or processes.”284 During the period from 1920
to 1927, each House consolidated oversight of executive branch ex-
penditures in a single committee devoted to expenditure oversight,
“capable of fully looking over the Executive Branch’s documents.”285
Dismissing claims in the House General Counsel brief that the district
court’s ruling would “radically,” “profoundly,” and “drastically”
278. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives in Support of Reversal at 1 n.1, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. docketed
May 10, 2002).
279. Id. at 1.
280. Id. at 2.
281. Id. at 3.
282. Id.
283. Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 3, Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-
55825 (9th Cir. docketed May 10, 2002).
284. Id. at 4.
285. Id. at 7.
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change executive-legislative relations over information access dis-
putes,286 the Democratic brief describes section 2954, like the Free-
dom of Information Act, “as a sensible mandatory disclosure statute
for documents not subject to executive privilege.”287
IX.  THE GAO INVESTIGATIONS
Congress relies on the General Accounting Office (GAO) to in-
vestigate executive agencies for inefficient and possibly corrupt prac-
tices. Various statutory authorities direct the GAO to examine
agency documents and papers. If agencies withhold documents, the
GAO has a number of options, including going to court. This Part re-
views the statutory authorities, the difficulties that the GAO may en-
counter in gaining access to agency records, and the current collision
between the GAO and Vice President Dick Cheney with regard to
documents requested about the operation of the energy task force.
A. Statutory Authorities
Congress created the GAO in 1921 to strengthen legislative con-
trol over executive agencies. The enabling statute directed the Comp-
troller General, as head of the GAO, to investigate “all matters re-
lated to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money.”288 To
enable the Comptroller General to perform that function, depart-
ments and establishments were to “furnish” information regarding
the powers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and
methods of business “as he . . . from time to time require[d] of
them.”289 The Comptroller General and his assistants were to “have
access to and the right to examine any books, documents, papers, or
records of any such department or establishment.”290
Comparable language appears in current law. The Comptroller
General “shall investigate all matters related to the receipt, disburse-
ment, and use of public money.”291 However, the scope of that investi-
gative power is qualified by other statutory provisions. “When an
agency record is not made available to the Comptroller General
286. Id. at 13.
287. Id. at 15–16.
288. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 312(a), 42 Stat. 20, 25 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 712(1) (2000)).
289. Id. § 313, 42 Stat. at 26.
290. Id.
291. 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2000).
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within a reasonable time,” the Comptroller General may issue what is
called a “demand letter,” which is a written request to the agency
head, who has twenty days to describe the record withheld and the
reason for its withholding. If the Comptroller General is not given an
opportunity to inspect the record within the twenty-day period, the
Comptroller General may file a report with the president, the OMB
Director, the Attorney General, the agency head, and Congress.
Moreover, the Comptroller General may bring a civil action in fed-
eral court to require the agency head to produce a record and may
subpoena a record of a person “not in the United States Govern-
ment.”292
The Comptroller General may not bring a civil action or issue a
subpoena if any of the following conditions is met: (1) the record re-
lates to activities the president designates as “foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities”; (2) the record is specifically exempted
from disclosure to the Comptroller General by a statute that “without
discretion requires that the record be withheld from the Comptroller
General” and that also either establishes particular criteria for with-
holding the record from the Comptroller General or refers to par-
ticular types of records to be withheld from the Comptroller General;
or (3) no more than twenty days after the Comptroller General files a
report regarding the withholding of a record, the president or the
OMB Director certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress
both that the record could be withheld under Exemptions 5 or 7 of
the Freedom of Information Act “and disclosure reasonably could be
expected to impair substantially the operations of the Govern-
ment.”293 These procedures, however, do not “authorize information
to be withheld from Congress.”294
B. Problems of Access
A 1960 Senate document provided examples over the previous
five years in which the Defense Department, the State Department,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had
withheld information from the GAO. These conflicts were reported
292. Id. § 716(b)–(c)(1).
293. Id. § 716(d). Exemption 5 of the FOIA refers to “inter-agency or intra-agency memo-
randums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litiga-
tion with the agency,” while Exemption 7 covers certain records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (b)(7) (2000).
294. 31 U.S.C. § 716(e)(3) (2000).
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to the Senate Committee on Government Operations and to other
committees, sometimes leading to a resolution of the dispute and
sometimes not.295 In the case of the State Department, Congress sub-
sequently passed legislation to assist the GAO in obtaining docu-
ments, even to the point of providing for a cutoff of agency funds
thirty-five days after a refusal has been made to the GAO or perti-
nent congressional committees, unless the information is delivered or
the president certifies that he has forbidden its release and given his
reasons.296
In 1972, Deputy Comptroller General Robert Keller told a con-
gressional committee that the GAO had received good cooperation in
obtaining access to executive records except from the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and certain activities of the De-
partment of Treasury (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board). He said that the GAO
had been “experiencing increasing difficulties in obtaining access to
information” for programs involving U.S. relations with foreign coun-
tries.297 In 1975, Comptroller General Elmer Staats told a House
committee that the GAO did not know how much the United States
spent on intelligence. The GAO had stopped auditing CIA expendi-
tures in 1962 after being unable to obtain information, and had diffi-
culty in getting information from other intelligence agencies, includ-
ing the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency.298
A 1979 study by Joseph Pois, a lawyer and professor of public
administration, includes a chapter on the GAO’s access to informa-
tion in executive agency and contractors’ files and records. Much of
the chapter is devoted to the GAO’s continuing difficulty in obtaining
documents from the Defense Department. Even when the GAO ul-
295. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., REPORT ON REFUSALS TO THE GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE OF ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 86-108 (1960) (discussing individual cases in which information had or
had not been provided to the GAO).
296. See Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-383, § 111(d), 73 Stat.
717, 720 (establishing funding cutoffs for failure to provide information); Mutual Security Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, § 401(i), 73 Stat. 246, 254 (“All documents . . . which relate to the op-
eration or activities of the International Cooperation Administration shall be furnished to the
General Accounting Office . . . .”); S. DOC. NO. 86-108, at 11–12 (discussing the provisions of
the 1959 and 1960 acts).
297. 118 CONG. REC. 18,121 (1972).
298. Lawrence Meyer, GAO Is Unable to Give Costs of Intelligence, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
1975, at A2.
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timately prevailed or negotiated an acceptable compromise, lengthy
delays “detract[ed] from the timeliness” and usefulness of the even-
tual report.299
More recent studies describe the problems that the GAO en-
counters in seeking information from the executive branch. A 1996
GAO report on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) stated that
the scope of the study “was significantly impaired” by a lack of coop-
eration from the CIA, the National Intelligence Council, and the De-
partments of Defense and State. Officials from Defense and State re-
ferred the GAO to the CIA, which declined to cooperate, explaining
that GAO review of certain NIEs would be contrary to oversight ar-
rangements that Congress had established.300 The GAO requested
statutory authority to expand its oversight role of CIA but has not re-
ceived it.
At House hearings in 1997, a GAO official described the prob-
lems that he and his colleagues had encountered in conducting a re-
view of counternarcotics activities in Colombia. A lengthy screening
program within the State Department delayed by several months de-
livery of documents to the GAO. Moreover, the department “denied
. . . access to some documents and deleted or redacted information
from others.”301 The experience contrasted with State Department co-
operation the previous two years when the GAO conducted counter-
narcotics reviews in Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru.302
In 1997, a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee held hearings on the GAO’s investigation of allegations that there
had been 938 overnight guests in the Executive Residence of the
White House. The subcommittee wanted to know whether the
$550,000 in overtime pay for thirty-six full-time White House em-
ployees (maids, butlers, chefs, housekeepers, doormen, etc.) was re-
lated to these overnight stays. Seven months after the subcommittee
had ordered the investigation, the GAO was unable to comply be-
299. JOSEPH POIS, WATCHDOG ON THE POTOMAC: A STUDY OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 115–59 (1979).
300. NAT’L SEC. AND INT’L AFFAIRS DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN
MISSILE THREATS: ANALYTIC SOUNDNESS OF CERTAIN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
15 (1996) (GAO/NSIAD-96-225, B-274120).
301. International Drug Control Policy: Colombia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l
Sec., Int’l Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight,
105th Cong. 70 (1997) (statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, U.S.
General Accounting Office).
302. Id. at 73 (statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office).
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cause information had been withheld by the White House. The in-
formation was denied to the GAO to “preserve the privacy of the
First Family.”303 However, in previous years the GAO had audited the
Executive Residence without difficulty.304
On March 6, 2001, the GAO reported to the House Committee
on International Relations regarding its study about U.S. participa-
tion in UN peacekeeping operations. After the Departments of State
and Defense and the National Security Council had failed to provide
the GAO access to the records it requested, the Comptroller General
issued “demand letters” to the heads of each agency. After almost
nine months of effort, the GAO obtained from the Department of
State “reasonable access” to records. Following the demand letter,
the Department of Defense provided some material, but the GAO
had access to only about one-quarter of the Defense records it had
requested, and many of those were heavily redacted. The NSC re-
sponded by denying the GAO “full and complete access to the rec-
ords.”305
Access to FBI records continues to be a problem for the GAO.
A report of June 20, 2001, disclosed that of all the law enforcement-
related agencies, the problem of gaining access to FBI records has
been the “most sustained and intractable.”306 The GAO’s experience
with the FBI “is by far our most contentious among law enforcement
agencies.”307
C. The GAO-Cheney Face-off
The GAO’s statutory procedure for issuing a demand letter and
taking a dispute to civil court were both used in 2001 and 2002 in an
effort to obtain information from Vice President Dick Cheney about
303. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1998
(Part 6: GAO Investigation of the White House): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 7 (1997).
304. Id. at 11.
305. Letter from Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
General Accounting Office, and Anthony H. Gamboa, Acting General Counsel, U.S. General
Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on In-
ternational Relations, and Benjamin Gilman, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on the Middle East and South Asia 2 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
306. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. OF THE
JUDICIARY, GAO’S WORK AT THE FBI: ACCESS TO DATA, DOCUMENTS, AND PERSONNEL 1
(2001) (GAO-01-888T) (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Tax Administra-
tion and Justice Issues).
307. Id. at 6.
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his energy task force. Starting with little fanfare, the dispute escalated
in intensity and publicity after Enron’s bankruptcy in December 2001.
As Enron executives came under fire for unethical and possibly
criminal conduct, newspaper headlines began to suggest that
Cheney’s refusal to release documents to the GAO might somehow
be an obstruction of justice. That was a misconception, but miscon-
ceptions carry weight and they are very difficult to correct. The con-
troversy did damage to both Cheney and the GAO. Several leading
Republicans in the House and the Senate ripped the accounting
agency and threatened deep cuts in its budget. The costs were so high
that both sides looked for a graceful exit through some type of face-
saving compromise.
A complicating factor in the GAO-Cheney standoff is Cheney’s
claim that the agency wanted to interfere with the “deliberative proc-
ess” required for the executive branch. The GAO insists that it only
wants “facts” about the “development” and “formulation” of energy
policy. At what point does a GAO inquiry into the development and
formulation of energy policy begin to shade into an investigation of
the deliberative process? One analyst thought that if the GAO were
to prevail in this contest, it “could strengthen the ability of Congress,
or even a single lawmaker, to find out details not only about the pol-
icy deliberations of federal agencies, but also about discussions in the
West Wing.”308 That seems to me an overstatement, but the filing of a
lawsuit is fraught with uncertainties for both sides.
1. The Legislative Request. The dispute began on April 19, 2001,
when Representatives John Dingell and Henry Waxman wrote to
Comptroller General David Walker, asking him to determine who
served on the energy policy task force chaired by Vice President
Cheney. It was their understanding that the task force had met in pri-
vate with “exclusive groups of non-governmental participants—in-
cluding political contributors—to discuss specific polices [sic], rules,
regulations, and legislation.”309 Dingell and Waxman, serving as
ranking members of two committees with jurisdiction over federal
energy policy (respectively, the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and the House Committee on Government Reform), told
Walker that they questioned the “apparent efforts of the task force to
shield its membership and deliberations from public scrutiny.”310 The
308. Jill Barshay, Risk Enough for All in Walker v. Cheney, 60 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 562,
562 (2002).
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word “deliberations” would trigger a major dispute between the two
legislators and the vice president’s office.
The April 19 letter directed the GAO to produce a list of all task
force members and staff, including their name, title, office, or em-
ployer represented. Moreover, the lawmakers wanted a list of all task
force meetings, including the date, location, and duration of each
meeting; the attendees at each task force meeting; the criteria used by
the task force to determine which nonfederal entities were invited to
the meetings; the direct and indirect costs incurred by the task force;
and other matters.311
On the same day, Dingell and Waxman wrote to Andrew Lund-
quist, executive director of the task force. They said it was their un-
derstanding that private meetings had been held at federal facilities
“with the participation of both federal employees and private citizens
and groups, including political contributors.”312 It was their concern
that the closed-door meetings “[would] violate the letter and the spirit
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).”313 Attached to the
letter were questions relating to the task force meetings, including
some of the information requested of the GAO, but also much more
specific data: the purpose and outcome of each meeting; whether
transcripts or detailed minutes of the meeting were kept; and whether
invitations had been extended to governors, state public utility com-
missioners, representatives of organized labor, representatives of con-
sumer advocacy groups, and small business representatives.314 This in-
formation, including “copies of all documents and records produced
or received by the task force,” was to be delivered to the two law-
makers by May 4, 2001.315
On the date of the deadline, Vice President Cheney’s counsel,
David Addington, wrote to the two House committees, identifying
both the chairmen (W. J. “Billy” Tauzin and Dan Burton) and the
309. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform, to David Walker,
Comptroller General, General Accounting Office 1 (Apr. 19, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 2.
312. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform, to Andrew Lund-
quist, U.S. Department of Energy 1 (Apr. 19, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 3–5.
315. Id. at 1.
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two ranking minority members, Dingell and Waxman. It was Adding-
ton’s position that FACA did not apply to the task force because it
“does not apply to a group ‘composed wholly of full-time, or perma-
nent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal Government.’”316
However, “[as] a matter of comity between the legislative and execu-
tive branches,” he provided information on the composition of the
task force and pointed out that task force members “have met with
many individuals who are not Federal employees to gather informa-
tion relevant to the Group’s work, but such meetings do not involve
deliberations or any effort to achieve consensus on advice or recom-
mendations.”317 The task force had met with “a broad representation
of people potentially affected by the Group’s work,” including indi-
viduals from companies or industries from various sectors, such as
electricity, telecommunications, coal mining, petroleum, gas, refining,
bioenergy, solar energy, nuclear energy, pipeline, railroad and auto-
mobile manufacturing; environmental, wildlife, and marine advocacy;
state and local utility regulation and energy management; research
and teaching at universities; research and analysis at policy organiza-
tions (think tanks); energy consumers; a major labor union; and about
three dozen members of Congress and their staff.318
Addington’s letter provided the dates and locations of all task
force meetings and the general purpose and outcome of the meet-
ings.319 With regard to questions about whether the meetings were no-
ticed in advance, open to the public, and on the record, an attachment
to the letter explained that section 3(2) of FACA provides that the
term “advisory committee” excludes “any committee that is com-
posed wholly of full-time, or permanent full-time, officers or employ-
ees of the Federal Government.”320
On May 15, 2001, Dingell and Waxman wrote to Lundquist and
told him it was inappropriate to refuse the records they requested.
Lundquist’s actions, they said, “only serve[d] to deepen public suspi-
316. Letter from David Addington, Counsel to the Vice-President, to W.J. “Billy” Tauzin,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, et al. 1 (May 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
317. Id. at 1, 3.
318. Id. at 3–4.
319. Id. at 4.
320. Id. Actually, the exemption in FACA reads: “any committee which is composed wholly
of full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government.” Federal Advisory Committee
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 3(2)(C), 86 Stat. 770, 770. (1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C)
(2000).
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cion over the Administration’s apparent efforts to shield the member-
ship and deliberations of the task force and its staff from public scru-
tiny.”321 To help Lundquist “better understand” their request for rec-
ords, they attached a definition that included such items as minutes,
drafts, notes, logs, diaries, video recordings, e-mails, voicemails, and
computer tapes.322 In subsequent months, the GAO would back away
from the breadth of that definition and scale down its request.
2. Challenging the GAO’s Legal Authority. The dispute sharp-
ened on May 16, 2001, when Addington wrote to Anthony Gamboa,
the GAO’s General Counsel, raising questions about a GAO fax
transmittal sheet that asked to interview officials of the energy task
force and the group’s support staff. The fax explained that it was the
GAO’s intent “‘to review the composition and workings of the Presi-
dent’s Energy Policy Development Group.’”323 To Addington, the
GAO was seeking to inquire
into the exercise of the authorities committed to the Executive by
the Constitution, including the authority to “require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
321. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform, to Andrew Lund-
quist, Executive Director, National Energy Policy Development 1 (May 15, 2001) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
322. Id. at 2–3. The letter defined “records” in the
broadest sense [, meaning] any written or graphic material, however produced or re-
produced, of any kind or description, consisting of the original and any non-identical
copy (whether different from the original because of notes made on or attached to
such copy or otherwise) and drafts and both sides thereof, whether printed or re-
corded electronically or magnetically or stored in any type of data bank, including,
but not limited to, the following: correspondence, memoranda, records, summaries of
personal conversations or interviews, minutes or records of meetings or conferences,
opinions or reports of consultants, projections, statistical statements, drafts, contracts,
agreements, purchase orders, invoices, confirmations, telegraphs, telexes, agendas,
books, notes, pamphlets, periodicals, reports, studies, evaluations, opinions, logs, dia-
ries, desk calendars, appointment books, tape recordings, video recordings, e-mails,
voice mails, computer tapes, or other computer stored matter, magnetic tapes, micro-
film, microfiche, punch cards, all other records kept by electronic, photographic, or
mechanical means, charts, photographs, notebooks, drawings, plans, inter-office
communications, intra-office and intra-departmental communications, transcripts,
checks and canceled checks, bank statements, ledgers, books, records or statements of
accounts, and papers and things similar to any of the foregoing, however denomi-
nated.
323. Letter from David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, to Anthony Gamboa,
General Counsel, General Accounting Office 1 (May 16, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (quoting Fax Transmittal Sheet from Margaret J. Reese, Assistant Director for Natural
Resources and Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, to the National Energy Policy
Development Group (May 8, 2001)).
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ments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices,” to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and,
with respect to Congress, to “recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”324
After citing these constitutional duties, Addington said it appeared
that the GAO “may intend to intrude into the heart of Executive de-
liberations, including deliberations among the President, the Vice
President, members of the President’s Cabinet, and the President’s
immediate assistants, which the law protects to ensure the candor in
Executive deliberations necessary to effective government.”325 He
closed by urging Gamboa to ask the Comptroller General to examine
whether “the proposed inquiry is appropriate, in compliance with the
law, and, especially in light of the information already provided as a
matter of comity, a productive use of resources.”326 Addington rec-
ommended that Walker “not proceed with the proposed inquiry.”327 If
Walker decided to go forward, Addington asked Gamboa to send a
statement of the GAO’s legal authority.328
It took the GAO two weeks to prepare a memorandum on its le-
gal authorities. In the meantime, Dingell and Waxman wrote to Ad-
dington that they were “dismayed” by his letter questioning the
GAO’s authority to conduct an investigation.329 Congressional over-
sight of the executive branch, they said, “includes the ability to ex-
amine all deliberations.”330 They asked whether the administration
was relying on executive privilege, which can be invoked only by the
president. If that was the intent, they wanted to receive clarification
directly from President George W. Bush.331 Executive privilege was
not invoked in this instance. Dingell and Waxman closed by stating
that “it is a shame” that the Cheney task force “has begun delibera-
tions” with such a “determined attitude of secrecy and stonewall-
ing.”332 They said that Congress and the public had a “right to know
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform, to David Adding-
ton, Counsel to the Vice President 1 (May 22, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 2.
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how the energy policy was developed, including what special interests
were consulted, what influence they had, and how competing interests
were reconciled.”333
Over time, the emphasis on “deliberations” by Dingell, Waxman,
and the GAO would be replaced by asking how the policy was devel-
oped and formulated. The GAO seemed to think that an inquiry into
policy formulation is not as intrusive as one into policy deliberation.
Distinctions in this area are difficult to understand. For example,
when Gamboa wrote to Addington on June 1, 2001, explaining the
GAO’s legal authority to conduct the investigation, the subject of the
letter is entitled “GAO’s Review of the Development of the Admini-
stration’s National Energy Policy.”334 The key word is now develop-
ment. As to Addington’s concern that the GAO was intruding “into
the heart of Executive deliberations,” Gamboa insisted that the
GAO’s legal authority “extends to deliberative process informa-
tion.”335 However, in the particular investigation of the Cheney task
force, Gamboa said “we are not inquiring into the deliberative proc-
ess but are focused on gathering factual information regarding the
process of developing President Bush’s National Energy Policy.”336
Gamboa denied that the GAO “at [that] time” was requesting an in-
terview with Cheney “or cabinet officials.”337 He did want the GAO to
interview Lundquist and “other officials” involved in the energy task
force.338
The first mention of Enron Corporation appears in a June 5,
2001, letter from Waxman to Representative Dan Burton, chairman
of the House Committee on Government Reform. Waxman cites a
May 25, 2001, New York Times article reporting that the head of En-
ron, Kenneth Lay, had met with Cheney for thirty minutes earlier in
the Spring and states that the task force report “includes much of
what Mr. Lay advocated during their meeting.”339 The article points
333. Id.
334. Letter from Anthony Gamboa, General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting Office, to
David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President 1 (June 1, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id at 2.
338. Id.
339. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Re-
form, to Dan Burton, Chairman, Committee on Government Reform 1 (June 5, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
FISHER.DOC 01/03/03 11:08 AM
384 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:323
out that Enron was a major donor to Republican causes.340 Waxman
told Burton that Congress and the public “have the right to know how
the Administration develops policy in important areas such as energy
issues, and the extent to which large donors are influencing such pol-
icy.”341 He urged Burton to hold hearings on the Cheney task force to
examine a number of matters, including “meetings attended by non-
federal participants,” the purpose of each meeting, and “what was
discussed.”342
On June 7, 2001, Addington wrote to Gamboa and commented
upon the three statutes identified by the GAO as the legal basis for its
inquiry. Addington concluded that two of the statutes provided no le-
gal basis for the inquiry, and the third statute provided a legal basis
for only a limited inquiry. The first statute requires the Comptroller
General to “evaluate the results of a program or activity the Govern-
ment carries out under existing law” when a committee of Congress
with jurisdiction over the program or activity “requests the evalua-
tion.”343 Addington said that this statutory provision did not justify the
GAO inquiry because (1) the task force functioned under executive
authorities granted by the Constitution and thus was not a program or
activity carried out “under existing law,” and (2) the Dingell-Waxman
request did not “constitute a ‘request’ from a ‘committee of Congress
with jurisdiction over the program or activity.’”344
The second statute provided that each agency shall give the
Comptroller General information that the Comptroller General re-
quires about the duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial
transactions of the agency, allowing the Comptroller General to in-
spect an agency record to get the information.345 Addington said that
this provision of law provided only “the means for conducting an oth-
erwise authorized investigation,” but even those investigations are
limited by other legal authorities and privileges, “such as the constitu-
tionally-based Executive privilege.”346 President Bush did not invoke
executive privilege in this dispute.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 3.
342. Id.
343. Letter from David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, to Anthony Gamboa,
General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting Office 1 (June 7, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(3) (2000)).
344. Id. at 2.
345. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 716(a) (2000)).
346. Id.
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The third provision of law authorizes the Comptroller General to
investigate “all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use
of public money.”347 Addington promised to provide Gamboa with the
direct and indirect costs incurred by Vice President Cheney and the
task force staff. Addington also attached a presidential memorandum
of January 29, 2001, establishing the Cheney task force. The memo-
randum lists the officers of the task force, its mission, required re-
ports, and funding by the Department of Energy.
3. The Demand Letter. Three weeks later, Gamboa sent Ad-
dington a ten-page letter defending the GAO’s legal authority to
conduct the inquiry. Gamboa argued that the three statutes and their
legislative histories provided adequate authority to justify the in-
quiry.348 As to responding to a request from Dingell and Waxman in-
stead of a committee, Gamboa maintained that the GAO’s “Congres-
sional Protocols” (practice rather than law) placed requests from
“committee leaders” among the GAO’s top priorities for response.349
Gamboa told Addington that the Comptroller General was “prepared
to issue a demand letter” if he did not receive timely access to the in-
formation outlined in the GAO letter of June 1, 2001.350
Comptroller General Walker sent the demand letter on July 18,
2001, requiring Cheney to respond within twenty days. Walker said
that his study “focuse[d] on factual information, not the deliberative
process.”351 However, the factual information was requested to under-
stand “the development of the Administration’s” energy policy.352 At
what point does factual information edge into the deliberative proc-
ess? Walker asked for: (1) the names, titles, and offices represented
by the attendees at each of the nine meetings conducted by the task
force; (2) the names, titles, and offices of the six professional staff as-
signed to Cheney’s office to support the task force; (3) the dates and
locations of meetings between task force staff and individuals from
347. Id. at 3 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 712 (2000)).
348. Letter from Anthony Gamboa, General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting Office, to
David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President 10 (June 22, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
349. Id. at 8.
350. Id. at 2.
351. Letter from David Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, to
Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States 1 (July 18, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
352. Id.
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the private sector; (4) the names, titles, and offices of those individu-
als; (5) the purpose and agenda of those meetings; (6) minutes or
notes; (7) how the task force determined who would be invited to
these meetings; (8) the same information (dates, locations, names, ti-
tles, offices, purpose and agenda, minutes or notes, and criteria for
invitations) for the meetings that Cheney had; and (9) direct and indi-
rect costs of the task force.353 Much of this requested information
(such as minutes or notes) would be dropped from subsequent GAO
requests.
Cheney, refusing to release the names, said that if he responded
to the GAO’s request “any member of Congress can demand to know
who I meet with and what I talk to them about on a daily basis.”354 He
stated that after meeting with outside groups, those private interests
“were not in the meetings where we put together the policy and made
the recommendations to the president. That’s the big difference.”355 In
a letter of August 2, 2001, Cheney told the House of Representatives
that Walker had exceeded his lawful authority by trying to “unconsti-
tutionally interfere with the functioning of the Executive Branch.”356
An appendix to the letter gave reasons for Cheney’s refusal.
First, it said that the GAO was not evaluating the “results” of the task
force; it was “attempting to inquire into the process by which the re-
sults of the Group’s work were reached.”357 Second, the statutes giving
the GAO authority to obtain documents from executive agencies did
not apply because the term “agency” as used in those statutes “does
not include the Vice President of the United States, who is a constitu-
tional officer of the Government.”358 Third, the GAO would unconsti-
tutionally interfere with the functioning of the executive branch. Its
proposed inquiry as to how the president, the vice president, and
other senior advisers “execute the function of developing recommen-
dations for policy and legislation” involved “a core constitutional
function of the Executive Branch.”359
353. Id. at 1–2.
354. Joseph Curl, Cheney Refuses Demand by GAO, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at A1.
355. Id.
356. Letter from Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, to the House of
Representatives 1 (Aug. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
357. Id. app. 2.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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Here the administration uses the same word that the GAO had
highlighted in its earlier letters: the development of policy.360 A state-
ment by the GAO on August 6, 2001, insisted that the information it
requested from the administration “is purely factual in nature and
relates solely to the process used by the group.”361 How does one dis-
tinguish between the “process used” and the “deliberative process?”
The GAO issued its “last best offer” to Cheney on August 17,
2001. Walker explained that the records sought “would not reveal
communications between the President and his advisers and would
not unconstitutionally interfere with the functioning of the executive
branch.”362 He said he was not asking for “any communications in-
volving the President, the Vice President, or the President’s senior
advisers.”363 Walker now boiled down his request to four categories:
(1) the names of those present at the task force meetings, (2) the
names of the professional staff assigned to the task force, (3) who the
task force met with, including the date, subject, and location of the
meetings, and (4) the direct and indirect costs incurred in developing
the energy policy.364 Walker reminded Cheney that in a previous letter
the GAO had offered to eliminate the earlier request for minutes and
notes and for the information presented by private individuals. As a
“matter of comity,” Walker now excluded those two items from his
request.365
Walker’s letter to Cheney triggered a provision in law that
authorizes the president or the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget to “certify” that the information requested by the GAO
could not be made available for various reasons, including that “dis-
closure reasonably could be expected to impair substantially the op-
erations of the Government.”366 Certification would permanently
block a GAO lawsuit, and yet the administration chose not to issue a
certification. Bottom line: if GAO wants to go to court, proceed.
360. Gamboa, supra note 334, at 1; Gamboa, supra note 348, at 1.
361. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Statement (Aug. 6, 2001).
362. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office,
to Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States 1 (Aug. 17, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
363. Id. at 4.
364. Id. at 2.
365. Id.
366. 31 U.S.C. § 716(d)(1)(C) (2000).
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4. Going to Court. By September 7, 2001, after the requested
materials were not delivered, Walker began to prepare for the law-
suit. He said he expected to file suit by the end of the month.367 How-
ever, the terrorist attacks of September 11 caused the GAO to delay
filing out of deference to an administration hard-pressed by the cri-
sis.368 With the administration strained by the need to obtain emer-
gency legislation and to prosecute the war in Afghanistan, Walker de-
cided to wait.
Two developments early in 2002 rekindled the GAO-Cheney
dispute. First, after Enron declared bankruptcy in December 2001,
the press began to highlight the meetings it had with the energy task
force. Second, the administration for some reason disclosed that
Cheney and his aides had met with Enron six times in 2001.369 If that
type of information could be released by the administration, why not
the rest? When exceptions are made to a principle, the principle can
begin to look a little threadbare.
On January 24, 2002, Dingell and Waxman wrote to Walker,
urging him to proceed with a lawsuit. The need for the information
“has only increased over time, particularly with recent questions con-
cerning the influence of officials of Enron in the development of the
National Energy Policy.”370 Walker announced the following day that
he would sue the White House if it did not comply with his de-
mands.371 Newspaper headlines and subheads kept the spotlight on
Enron. A subhead in the Washington Post declared: “Hill Probes En-
ron Influence on Task Force.”372 Cheney, defending his position on
Fox News Sunday, argued that “what’s really at stake here is the abil-
ity of the president and the vice president to solicit advice from any-
367. GAO Prepares to Sue Cheney Over Records, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2001, at A13; Joseph
Kahn, Agency Likely to Sue White House to Force Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at A10.
368. Michael Grunwald & Ellen Nakashima, Amid War, GAO Puts Legal Fight with Cheney
on Hold, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A35.
369. Mike Allen, Cheney, Aides Met with Enron 6 Times in 2001, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002,
at A3.
370. Letter from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, House of Representatives Committee
on Energy and Commerce, and Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, House of Representa-
tives Committee on Government Reform, to David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S.
General Accounting Office 2 (Jan. 24, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
371. Dana Milbank & Dan Morgan, GAO Vows to Sue for Cheney Files, WASH. POST, Jan.
26, 2002, at A1.
372. Id.
FISHER.DOC 01/03/03 11:08 AM
2002] CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS 389
body they want in confidence—get good, solid, unvarnished advice
without having to make it available to a member of Congress.”373
Some Republicans began to desert the administration. Walker
said that Senator Fred Thompson and Representative Christopher
Shays wanted the White House to release the information.374 Thomp-
son, after deciding that the law favored the administration, thought
release of the records would be politically wise.375 Similarly, Represen-
tative Dan Burton concluded that Cheney’s legal position was
stronger than the GAO’s, but counseled that the administration
should release the records to secure public trust.376 Senator Charles
Grassley advised the White House to release the information.377
On January 30, 2002, Walker announced that he would file a case
in district court to obtain the documents he requested from the en-
ergy task force.378 It was necessary to take this action, he said, because
Congress
has a right to the information we are seeking in connection with its
consideration of comprehensive energy legislation and its ongoing
oversight activities. Energy policy is an important economic and en-
vironmental matter with significant domestic and international im-
plications. It affects the lives of each and every American. How it is
formulated has understandably been a longstanding interest of the
Congress. In addition, the recent bankruptcy of Enron has served to
increase congressional interest in energy policy . . . .379
On the same day, Dingell and Waxman wrote to Cheney to clar-
ify what they considered to be misconceptions about the GAO in-
quiry. They agreed that the president and the vice president are “gen-
erally entitled to confidentiality when discussing federal policies with
373. Dana Milbank, Cheney Refuses Records’ Release, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at A1.
374. Id.
375. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Robert Pear, Enron’s Many Strands: G.O.P. Senators Divide
over Disclosing Information on Enron-White House Contacts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C6.
376. Jill Barshay, supra note 308, at 563.
377. Oppel & Pear, supra note 375.
378. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office,
to Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform 3 (Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
379. Id. at 2.
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senior White House staff.”380 However, “confidentiality for discus-
sions among the President and the Vice President and their top aides
does not extend to external communications to the White House from
outside groups.”381 Included in the letter were ten recent precedents
where the GAO sought and received records of communications be-
tween outside groups and the White House.382 Dingell and Waxman
noted that President Bush “did not make—and could not reasonably
have made—the certification required under section 716 for with-
holding the information.”383
With Cheney taking a pounding in the press, Walker was not
coming off unscathed either. Part of the criticism directed at Walker
was the use of language that was unusual, if not unprecedented, for a
Comptroller General. Because the GAO is a nonpartisan agency
funded by Congress, it is usually extremely cautious and circumspect
in making public statements. Yet when Cheney said the task force
could not be scrutinized because he headed it in his capacity as vice
president, Walker replied: “If all you have to do is create a task force,
put the vice president in charge, detail people from different agencies
paid by taxpayers, outreach to whomever you want and then you can
circumvent Congressional oversight, that’s a loophole big enough to
drive a truck through.”384 After hearing Cheney object that the GAO
was overstepping its bounds, Walker remarked: “Talk is cheap.”385
These and other comments prompted charges that the GAO was
conducting an overzealous and partisan inquiry. To House Majority
Leader Dick Armey, “GAO is being pressured here on a partisan po-
litical basis, and they are wrong.”386 Senator Ted Stevens, the ranking
member of the Appropriations Committee, said he was “appalled” at
the GAO’s pursuit of the White House documents. He argued that
380. Letter from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Government Reform, to Richard
Cheney, Vice President of the United States 3 (Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
381. Id. at 2.
382. Id. at 4–6.
383. Id. at 7.
384. Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron’s Many Strands: Bush Says Privacy Is
Needed on Data from Enron Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A1.
385. Elizabeth Bumiller, Enron’s Many Strands: Cheney Is Set to Battle Congress to Keep
His Enron Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A1.
386. Dave Boyer, GOP Terms GAO’s Request a Partisan Hunt, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002,
at A4.
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the principle of separation of powers prevented such investigations,387
and warned that the lawsuit could mark the decline of the GAO.388
The GAO finally filed its long-delayed lawsuit on February 22.389
Other suits, filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), also
sought documents on the administration’s energy policy. On February
27, a federal judge ordered the Energy Department to turn over 7,500
pages of documents related to the Cheney task force.390 On March 6,
another federal judge in a FOIA case ordered seven government
agencies to release thousands of documents related to the Cheney
task force.391 Several other courts are involved in lawsuits seeking
documents from the task force.392 In addition to information that may
be made available from litigation, reporters are talking directly to
private groups involved in the task force meetings. A lengthy article
in the New York Times identifies the energy companies that met with
the task force and contributions they made to the Republican and
Democratic Parties in the 2000 election.393 Some of the industry offi-
cials who met with the task force expressed surprise at the effort to
keep the names secret: “Within the industry, there’s this feeling like,
‘Don’t we already know who was there?’”394
On December 9, 2002, District Judge John D. Bates dismissed
the GAO complaint by holding that the Comptroller General lacked
standing to bring the suit.395 The Comptroller General, said the court,
had suffered no personal injury, and any institutional injury would
exist only "in his capacity as an agent of Congress—an entity that it-
self has issued no subpoena to obtain the information and given no
expression of support for the pursuit of this action."396
387. Id.
388. Jill Barshay, GAO’s Walker Says He Hopes to Avoid Court Fight with Cheney over En-
ergy Task Force Documents, 60 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 396, 396 (2002).
389. Don Van Natta, Jr., Agency Files Suit for Cheney Papers on Energy Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2002, at A1.
390. Dana Milbank & Ellen Nakashima, Energy Dept. Ordered to Release Documents,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1.
391. Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Orders More Papers on Task Force Released, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2002, at A18.
392. Judges Knock Cheney Panel Court Efforts, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at A5.
393. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Top G.O.P. Donors in Energy Industry Met
Cheney Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at A1.
394. Id.
395. Walker v. Cheney, No. Civ.A. 02-0340 JDB, 2002 WL 31741823, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 9,
2002) (mem.).
396. Id. at *19.
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To obtain documents from the executive branch, Congress must
be willing to use its considerable leverage and press its advantage. In
this dispute, Congress and its committees decided not to do that, and
Judge Bates interpreted the congressional silence as a grave weakness
to GAO’s position. Comptroller General Walker found himself, po-
litically and institutionally, isolated.
5. Lieberman’s Subpoenas. Throughout this period, none of the
committees or subcommittees of Congress had issued a subpoena for
documents concerning the energy task force. On March 22, 2002, the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, chaired by Democratic
Senator Joseph Lieberman, issued twenty-nine subpoenas to Enron
to document its relationship to the administration’s energy task
force.397 At the same time, Lieberman said he would write letters to
the White House seeking information about its contacts with Enron,
instead of resorting to subpoenas.398 In response to Lieberman’s letter,
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales directed more than one
hundred staff members to complete a questionnaire that would detail
communications between the administration and Enron in the months
just before the company’s collapse.399 These White House efforts were
made under the threat of a subpoena that Lieberman held in re-
serve.400
As the weeks rolled by, Lieberman expressed dissatisfaction with
the lack of progress.401 Although White House Counsel Gonzales
asked that the subpoena not be issued,402 Lieberman decided on May
22, 2002, to subpoena the documents—the first congressional subpoe-
nas served on the Bush administration.403 Four hours after the sub-
poenas were delivered, the White House faxed Lieberman a six-page
letter showing that Enron executives had a number of meetings and
phone calls with White House officials that had been previously dis-
397. Dana Milbank, Senate Panel Says Enron Must Detail Policy Role, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 2002, at A1.
398. Id.
399. White House Staff to Answer Enron Questionnaire, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at A2.
400. Lieberman Angered by Response on Enron, WASH. POST, May 4, 2002, at A5; Richard
A. Oppel, Jr., Senator Presses for Information on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at C3.
401. Mike Allen, Subpoena Urged on Enron Records, WASH. POST, May 18, 2002, at A7;
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Democrats Escalate Efforts to Get White House to Disclose Enron
Contacts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2002, at C1.
402. White House Asks Subpoena Not Be Issued, WASH. POST, May 22, 2002, at A19.
403. Mike Allen, Panel Demands Enron Papers, WASH. POST, May 23, 2002, at A1.
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closed.404 The subpoenas flushed out a number of documents and e-
mails related to White House communications with Enron.405 In some
cases, the White House refused to make copies of Enron-related
documents but allowed Lieberman’s staff to come to the Eisenhower
Executive Office Building, which is next to the White House, and
look at some of them.406
6. White House Defense Strategies. The Waxman-Dingell re-
quest can be described as a “gotcha” legislative tactic: an effort by
lawmakers to put the administration immediately on the defensive
and possibly unearth some damaging information useful in political
campaigns. No doubt a relatively small legislative investment in time
and energy can put a White House in a tail-spin as it begins the labo-
rious search for documents. An alternative is to concoct strained legal
arguments that deny the lawmakers the documents, but at risk of ap-
pearing to engage in a cover-up. In the end, regardless of the merits
of the legal doctrines, the documents are likely to become public
anyway.
In the face of what appears to be a win-win legislative strategy, is
the administration without a remedy? A resourceful administration
has a number of ways to discourage or blunt a legislative inquiry. In
the case of the energy task force, the administration came to power
with noticeable attention to the business background of President
George W. Bush and the industry ties of Vice President Cheney, Sec-
retary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and other top officials. It would
have been prudent for the administration to go out of its way by
meeting with a plethora of environmental, consumer, and labor union
groups. When the time came for a legislative investigation of the en-
ergy task force, the administration could have released a lengthy list
of the groups it met with, without embarrassment. If an administra-
tion fails to protect itself in advance, it will take a political hit, and de-
servedly so.
At that point, an administration has to decide whether it is better
to release the damaging information early and absorb the blows—
404. Id.
405. Mike Allen, White House Gathers Enron Data, WASH. POST, May 25, 2002, at A4.
406. Mike Allen, White House Gives Lieberman Limited Access to Enron Data, WASH.
POST, June 4, 2002, at A2; see also Senate Panel Gets Some Enron Data, WASH. POST, June 5,
2002, at A4 (explaining that only after Lieberman’s deadline had passed did the White House
reluctantly provide Enron-related information).
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probably doing short-term damage—or drag out the investigation
with the risk that the outside world will learn the truth anyway, be-
cause other lawsuits will probably bring the documents to light. Ad-
ministrations are supposed to have an instinct for minimizing political
damage. They live in a political world and have to expect opponents
to score political points when they have an opportunity to do so, just
as the administration will score when it sees an opening.
X.  TESTIMONY BY WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS
Vice President Cheney’s argument that he enjoys a level of im-
munity from legislative inquiries, especially when he acts in an official
manner developing national policy, raises a related question about
White House aides. Tom Ridge, the director of the Office of Home-
land Security, announced on March 4, 2002, that he would refuse to
testify before congressional committees, claiming that he is an adviser
to President Bush and not a Cabinet officer.407 When White House of-
ficials are asked to testify before congressional committees, admini-
strations frequently advise Congress that under “long-established”
precedents the immediate staff of a president do not appear before
committees.408 In fact—given the right political conditions—they do
appear, and they appear in great numbers. A previous Part on the ap-
pointment power explained how presidential aide Peter Flanigan tes-
tified in 1972 as part of the Kleindienst nomination to be Attorney
General.409 This Part discusses many other examples.
A. Watergate Precedents
On March 2, 1973, President Nixon objected to the appearance
of White House Counsel John Dean at congressional hearings. Presi-
dent Nixon said that “no President could ever agree to allow the
Counsel to the President to go down and testify before a commit-
tee.”410 He later elaborated on the reasons for refusing to allow White
House aides to testify:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the manner in which the
407. See infra Part X.C.
408. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
409. See supra Part IV.B.
410. Richard Nixon, News Conference (Mar. 2, 1973), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON, 1973, at 151, 160 (1975) [hereinafter
NIXON PAPERS].
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President personally exercises his assigned executive powers is not
subject to questioning by another branch of Government. If the
President is not subject to such questioning, it is equally appropriate
that members of his staff not be so questioned, for their roles are in
effect an extension of the Presidency.411
In a statement on March 15, President Nixon offered other rea-
sons for denying Congress the right to question Dean at legislative
hearings: “Mr. Dean is Counsel to the White House. He is also one
who was counsel to a number of people on the White House Staff. He
has, in effect, what I would call a double privilege, the lawyer-client
relationship, as well as the Presidential privilege.”412 He repeated his
position that members of the White House staff “[would] not appear
before a committee of Congress in any formal session.”413
Political pressures made it impossible for President Nixon to ad-
here to these legal doctrines. On April 17, he agreed to allow White
House aides to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Presi-
dential Campaign Activities, provided they followed four ground
rules: White House aides would appear, in the first instance, in execu-
tive session, if appropriate; executive privilege would be expressly re-
served and could be asserted during the course of the hearing to any
question; the proceedings could be televised; and all members of the
White House staff would appear “voluntarily” and testify under oath
to “answer fully all proper questions.”414 Reference to the voluntary
appearance enabled President Nixon to retain some semblance of his
theory about separation of powers, but basically the White House ca-
pitulated while insisting that it did not have to.
On July 7, President Nixon further relaxed the guidelines. He di-
rected that the right of executive privilege concerning possible crimi-
nal conduct “no longer be invoked for present or former members of
the White House staff.”415 He also agreed to permit “the unrestricted
411. Richard Nixon, Statement about Executive Privilege (Mar. 12, 1973), in NIXON
PAPERS, supra note 410, at 184, 185.
412. Richard Nixon, News Conference (Mar. 15, 1973), in NIXON PAPERS, supra note 410, at
202, 203.
413. Id. at 211.
414. Richard Nixon, Remarks Announcing Procedures and Developments in Connection
with the Watergate Investigations (Apr. 17, 1973), in NIXON PAPERS, supra note 410, at 298,
299.
415. Letter from Richard Nixon, President of the United States, to Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chair-
man, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (July 7, 1973), in NIXON PAPERS,
supra note 410, at 636–37.
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testimony of present and former White House staff members” before
the committee.416 Beginning on May 17 and continuing until Septem-
ber 23, 1975, a number of White House aides testified before the
committee, including John Dean, Jeb Magruder, Alexander Butter-
field, Herbert Kalmbach, John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, Patrick
Buchanan, Leonard Garment, and General Alexander Haig, Jr.417
B. Other Accommodations
On October 31, 1975, Henry Kissinger appeared before the
House Select Committee on Intelligence, at a time when he served in
a dual capacity as secretary of state and national security adviser. In
1980, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler and National Security Ad-
viser Zbigniew Brzezinski appeared at hearings conducted by a sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate whether
Billy Carter, the president’s brother, had acted criminally in his rela-
tionship with Libya. President Jimmy Carter instructed all members
of the White House staff to cooperate fully with the subcommittee
and to “respond fully to such inquiries from the subcommittee and to
testify if the subcommittee determines that oral testimony is neces-
sary.”418 He was not about to fall on his sword for his brother’s mis-
judgments.
In 1987, President Reagan told executive officials, including
those in the White House, to assist in the congressional investigation
into the Iran-Contra affair in any way possible, including testifying
before Congress. The White House aides who testified at the hearings
included former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, former
National Security Adviser John Poindexter, and Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North, former staff member of the National Security Council.
Some of these officials, such as North, testified after receiving partial
immunity.
Congressional hearings in 1994 focused on whether White House
aides had inappropriately learned details of a Resolution Trust Cor-
poration investigation of the failed Madison Guaranty Savings and
Loan, with President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton named as
416. Id. at 637.
417. The complete list appears in Louis Fisher, White House Aides Testifying Before Con-
gress, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 141–42 (1997).
418. Jimmy Carter, Billy Carter’s Activities with the Libyan Government: White House
Statement on the Senate Judiciary Committee Inquiry (July 24, 1980), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER, 1980–81, AT 1420 (1982).
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potential beneficiaries of alleged wrongdoing at Madison.419 In 1995
and 1996, as part of the investigation of the dismissal of seven em-
ployees from the White House Travel Office in 1993, former assistant
to the president John Podesta and former director of the White
House Office of Administration David Watkins testified before the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.420
Senate hearings into the Whitewater Development Corporation
in 1995 and 1996 brought these White House officials before a special
Senate committee: Assistant to the President Mark Gearan, former
Special Assistant to the President Sylvia Mathews, Deputy Assistant
to the President Patsy Thomasson, former Assistant to the President
for Management and Administration David Watkins, White House
Deputy Press Secretary Evelyn Lieberman, Counsel to the President
Thomas McLarty, Assistant to the President Jack Quinn, Assistant to
the President Bruce Lindsey, Special Counsel to the President Jane
Sherburne, Special Assistant to the President Carolyn Huber, Deputy
Chief of White House Staff Harold Ickes, and many others.421
Even when the White House decides that presidential aides will
not testify, other mechanisms can be used to satisfy congressional
needs. In 1981, Martin Anderson, President Reagan’s assistant for
policy development, refused to appear before a House Appropria-
tions subcommittee responsible for funding his budget request for the
Office of Policy Development. The subcommittee retaliated by de-
leting all of the $2,959,000 requested for the office. In doing so, it
pointed out that the previous heads of the office (Stuart Eizenstat in
the Carter years, James Cannon in the Ford years, and Kenneth Cole
in the Nixon years) had appeared before the subcommittee. As a
compromise, Anderson met informally and off-the-record with the
subcommittee to respond to their questions. After the Senate re-
stored almost all of the funds, Congress appropriated $2,500,000 for
the office.422
419. A number of senior White House staff testified at the hearings: White House Counsel
Lloyd Cutler; Lisa Caputo, Press Secretary to Hillary Clinton; Associate Counsel to the presi-
dent Neil Eggleston; Assistant to the President Bruce Lindsey; former White House Chief of
Staff Thomas McLarty; former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum; Assistant to the
President John Podesta; Senior Policy Adviser to the President George Stephanopoulos; and
Margaret Williams, Chief of Staff to Hillary Clinton. Other White House attendees are cited in
Fisher, supra note 417, at 145–46.
420. Id. at 146–47.
421. Id. at 148–49.
422. Id. at 139–40.
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C. Tom Ridge
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush issued
an executive order to establish the Office of Homeland Security, to be
located within the Executive Office of the president.423 Because of its
location within the president’s office and its creation by executive or-
der instead of by statute, the White House could argue that the head
of the Office of Homeland Security would have protection against
testifying before congressional committees. President Bush appointed
Tom Ridge to head the office.
In a letter of March 4, 2002, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of
West Virginia and Republican Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, the
chairman and ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, in-
vited Ridge to testify before their committee on April 9, 10, and 11.424
The White House announced that Ridge would not appear because
he was an “adviser” to President Bush, not a Cabinet officer.425 A let-
ter of March 13 from White House liaison Nicholas Calio advised the
two Senators that “members of the President’s staff do not ordinarily
testify before congressional committees.”426
Not receiving a response from Ridge, Senators Byrd and Stevens
wrote to President Bush, pointing out that the budget he submitted to
Congress proposed $38 billion for over eighty federal departments
and agencies for homeland defense. It was their position that Ridge
“is the single Executive Branch official with the responsibility to inte-
grate the many complex functions of the various Federal agencies in
the formulation and execution of homeland defense programs.”427
They further argued that the duties and responsibilities that President
Bush had assigned to Ridge are “much broader in scope than the staff
role of advising the President,” and that unless Ridge testified, they
would have “no recourse but to invite witnesses from more than
423. Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, 66
Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001).
424. Letter from Ted Stevens, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, to Tom Ridge, Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security 1 (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
425. Allison Mitchell, Letter to Ridge Is Latest Jab in Fight over Balance of Powers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at A8.
426. See Letter from Ted Stevens, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations,
and Robert C. Byrd, Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States 1 (Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing
the March 13 letter that senators Stevens and Byrd received from Calio).
427. Id.
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eighty Federal departments and agencies that participate in homeland
defense programs.”428 Byrd and Stevens renewed their request for
Ridge to testify before the Appropriations Committee and asked to
meet with President Bush to explain their intentions.”429
The meeting with President Bush did not take place, but the let-
ter from Byrd and Stevens prompted a letter from Ridge to Byrd, of-
fering a compromise designed to “avoid the setting of a precedent
that could undermine the Constitutional separation of powers and the
long-standing traditions and practices of both Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch.”430 Ridge proposed that he provide a public briefing
in April to Senators and members of Congress. Joining him would be
executive officials with operational authority over the homeland secu-
rity programs. Lawmakers would have the opportunity to ask ques-
tions of Ridge and the other executive officials, with the proceedings
open to both the public and the press.431 How that proposal protects
the constitutional separation of powers and “long-standing traditions
and practices” is difficult to fathom. Probably no credible explanation
could be offered by the administration. Under pressure from both
parties, the White House devised an accommodation that it hoped
would settle the dispute.
While Senators Byrd and Stevens considered this proposal,
Ridge offered to “informally” brief two House committees.432 He fol-
lowed through by meeting informally with a subcommittee of House
Appropriations and the House Government Reform Committee.433
Ridge also met with a group of Senators to discuss border security is-
428. Id.
429. Id. at 2.
430. Letter from Tom Ridge, Assistant to the President, Office of Homeland Security, to
Robert C. Byrd, Senate Committee on Appropriations 1 (Mar. 25, 2002) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
431. Id.
432. Ridge made offers to meet informally with two House committees and additionally
hold thirty-five individual meetings with members of Congress. Elizabeth Becker, Ridge to Brief
2 House Panels, but Rift with Senate Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A19; Byrd Presses
Ridge to Speak to Committee, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2002, at A2.
433. Elizabeth Becker, Ridge Briefs House Panel, but Discord Is Not Resolved, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2002, at A23; Bill Miller, From Bush Officials, a Hill Overture and a Snub, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 2002, at A27.
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sues.434 Ridge explained that he was willing to meet with lawmakers in
“briefings” but not “hearings.”435
These artificial distinctions created by the White House—allow-
ing Ridge to meet informally and take questions but not appear for-
mally to take questions, or to participate in briefings but not hear-
ings—added fuel to congressional efforts to create a Department of
Homeland Security and have the agency headed by someone who
must be confirmed by the Senate and subject to being called to testify.
Statutory action would override President Bush’s executive order and
neutralize White House arguments about Ridge functioning as a
presidential adviser. Congress could have compromised by creating
both a statutory department and a small Office of Homeland Security
located in the White House. However, the statute establishing a De-
partment of Homeland Security makes no mention of a White House
office.436 The Office of Homeland Security remains within the White
House, as a presidential creation.
CONCLUSION
Congress depends on information from the executive branch to
perform its constitutional duties. Much of the information that Con-
gress seeks is located within executive agencies that are created,
authorized, and funded by Congress. In both a legal and constitu-
tional sense, agencies are “creatures” of Congress and must learn to
serve both the executive and legislative branches.437 As greater por-
tions of executive power move to the president’s office, Congress has
a similar need to gain access to White House documents and compel
White House aides to testify.
Whether lawmakers obtain that information depends on their
willingness and ability to expend the energy and time it takes to over-
come bureaucratic hurdles. To do that well, members of Congress
have to think of themselves as belonging to an institution rather than
a variety of interests. The White House and agencies have become
more skilled in resisting legislative inquiries, particularly when they
434. Bill Miller, Ridge to Brief Senators About Border Security, WASH. POST, May 2, 2002, at
A2.
435. Bill Miller, On Homeland Security Front, a Rocky Day on the Hill, WASH. POST, May 3,
2002, at A25.
436. 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
437. LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
106–45 (4th ed. 1998).
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come from a Congress controlled by the opposition party. Although
presidents routinely announce that they will “cooperate fully” with a
congressional investigation, they have also learned “to blunt, to parry,
and to outlast the accusations against them.”438 Similarly, agencies dig
in while flooding committees with marginal or extraneous material.
Congress has the theoretical edge because of the more than adequate
tools at its disposal. What it needs primarily is motivation, the staying
power to cope with a long and frustrating battle, and an abiding
commitment to honor its constitutional purpose.
Untidy as they are, political battles between Congress and the
executive branch are generally effective in resolving executive privi-
lege disputes. Courts play a minor role, which is good for the judiciary
and good for the country. There is no reason to think that greater in-
volvement by courts would be constructive or helpful. The risk is
great that the Supreme Court, in trying to settle one issue, will fashion
standards and doctrines that may prove to be too broad and awk-
wardly drawn. For example, in the Watergate tapes case, Chief Justice
Warren Burger resorted to clumsy dicta and ceded ground to presi-
dents who claim a “need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets.”439 That issue was not before the Court, was
never argued or briefed, and should not have been addressed.
Nevertheless, journalists and even academics seem to think that
if the president announces that information falls within the categories
of military, diplomatic, or “sensitive national security secrets,” the
other two branches should back off. If the courts want to do that, they
may retreat in the face of such presidential claims. Congress should
not. The Watergate tapes case concerned access to information by the
judiciary, not Congress.440 Lawmakers, with specific constitutional du-
ties over issues involving the military and national security, have no
reason to defer to such presidential arguments.441
Political understandings and settlements have kept executive-
legislative conflicts over information to a manageable level. Legal and
constitutional principles serve as guides, but no more than that. Preci-
sion in this area cannot be expected or even desired. Alexander
Bickel recognized that large societies will explode if they cannot de-
438. Tiefer, supra note 118, at 146.
439. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
440. A footnote in the Court’s decision makes this distinction clear: “We are not here con-
cerned with . . . congressional demands for information . . . .” Id. at 712 n.19.
441. Fisher, supra note 39, at 602–27.
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vise accommodations and middle positions to overcome conflict. His
advice four decades ago remains sound today: “No good society can
be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.”442
442. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 49 (1961).
